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Abstract
Constantino, Christopher. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August 2018. The Subjective
Experience of Stuttering. Major Professor: Walter H. Manning, Ph.D.

In this dissertation, I investigate the subjective experience of stuttering. I use two distinct
methodologies to look at two different aspects of the stuttering experience. In the first paper, I
use a post-structural qualitative research methodology to better understand the experience of
passing as fluent. In the second paper, I use the experience sampling method to quantify the
mental and physical effort, what I call spontaneity, of stuttered speech.
When a person who stutters can hide their stuttering to the extent that others do not know
they stutter, they are said to pass as fluent. In the first paper I seek a more nuanced understanding
of passing by asking how a person must relate to herself to pass as fluent. To answer this
question, I utilize the ethical theories of philosopher Michel Foucault to contextualize data
obtained from semi-structured interviews with nine participants who pass as fluent. The data
suggests that rather than a repression of an authentic self, passing is more usefully understood as
a form of resistance by people who stutter to a hostile society. Participants learned from
experiences of delegitimization that their stuttering had ethical ramifications. Consequently, they
used a variety of self-forming practices to pass and thereby achieve the privileges that come with
perceived able-bodiedness.
The second study measures spontaneity of speech in everyday speaking situations.
Spontaneous speech is characterized by little premeditation, effortless production, and is
enjoyable/meaningful. Attention is not directed on the physical production of speech. This is the
first study to attempt to measure the concept of spontaneity of speech. The experience sampling
method was used with 44 people who stutter. They were surveyed five times a day for one week
v

through their cell phones. Results indicate that spontaneity and fluency vary by context and day.
Importantly, an increase in spontaneity significantly decreases the impact of stuttering on
people’s lives. Fluency did not significantly affect life impact of stuttering. This suggests that
therapies that increase fluency without accompanying increases in spontaneity may fail to
improve quality of life for people who stutter.
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Chapter 1: General Introduction
Stuttering is common; the same number of people stutter as speak French
(Bloodstein & Bernstein Ratner, 2008; Parkvall, 2007). When listening to someone who
stutters, you may notice syllable repetitions, sound prolongations, silent blocks, and a host of
other behaviors (Manning & DiLollo, 2018). However, the experience of the person stuttering is
much richer than these observable behaviors convey (Sheehan, 1972). The speaker’s experience
of stuttering is greater than the sum of their disfluencies.
In this dissertation is an investigation into the speaker’s subjective experience of
stuttering. I use two distinct methodologies to look at two different aspects of the stuttering
experience. In the first paper, I use a post-structural qualitative research methodology to better
understand the experience of passing as fluent (Murphy, Quesal, & Gulker, 2007). In the second
paper, I use the experience sampling method to quantify the experience of mental and physical
effort, what I call spontaneity, while speaking (Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2007).
When a person who stutters can hide their stuttering to the extent that others do not know
they stutter, they are said to pass as fluent. Passing as fluent, also called covert stuttering, has
been uncritically framed as an inherently negative pursuit (Douglass & Quarrington, 1952).
Historically passing has been understood as a repression of one’s true, authentic self in response
to either psychological distress or social discrimination (Brune & Wilson, 2013). In the first
study (Chapter 2), I seek a more nuanced understanding of passing by asking how a person
relates to herself in order to pass as fluent (Foucault, 1985/1990). This is a qualitative research
study in which the authors utilized the ethical theories of philosopher Michel Foucault to
contextualize data obtained from semi-structured interviews with nine participants who pass as
fluent (Gubrium & Holstein, 2003).
1

The second study (Chapter 3) measures spontaneity of speech in everyday speaking
situations. The severity of stuttering is often determined by frequency of disfluency measures
(Riley, 2009), but these are notoriously unreliable, highly variable, and have little relationship
with the impact of the disorder on people’s lives (Constantino, Leslie, Quesal, & Yaruss, 2016;
Yaruss, 1997b; Yaruss & Quesal, 2006). Despite these drawbacks, much research and clinical
work in stuttering focuses primarily on decreased frequency of stuttering (Marcotte & Santus,
2015; Nippold, 2011). Therapy techniques that increase fluency often require considerable selfmonitoring and make speech difficult (Ingham, 1984; Perkins, 1985). That is, fluency is gained
at the expense of spontaneity. Spontaneous speech is characterized by little premeditation,
effortless production, and is enjoyable/meaningful. Attention is not directed on the physical
production of speech.
In the second study, I ask three primary research questions: 1) Is spontaneity of speech
measurable, 2) Is spontaneity meaningfully distinct from fluency, and 3) If so, what are the
consequences. My hypothesis is that a measure of the degree to which speech is spontaneous—
whether fluent or stuttered—is a more accurate predictor of speakers’ ratings of their stuttering
experience than the frequency of their stuttering. I answer these questions by measuring
participants’ frequency of disfluency and spontaneity in speech as close to the experiences of
speaking as possible using intensive longitudinal surveys administered through mobile phone
applications (Walls & Schafer, 2006). This technique is known alternatively as ecological
momentary assessment (Stone & Shiffman, 1994; Wu, Stangl, Zhang, & Bentler, 2015) or the
experience sampling method (Hektner et al., 2007). Using linear mixed models, I then build
models for momentary perceived spontaneity, momentary perceived fluency, and life impact of
stuttering.
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Our knowledge of the speaker’s experience of stuttering is limited. Our treatment
approaches often focus more on the outward manifestations of stuttering (i.e., disfluencies),
rather than the inner experience of the speaker. The results of these studies will improve our
understanding of the speaker’s experience of stuttering. Armed with this knowledge, we can
design and implement treatment approaches that better address the needs of people who stutter.
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Chapter 2: Rethinking Covert Stuttering
Introduction
Stuttering is commonly understood as a speech disorder that manifests as part-word
repetitions, prolongations, and blocks (Bloodstein & Bernstein Ratner, 2008). These are all overt
speech events that carry acoustic and perceptual consequences that are available to the listener.
However, some people who stutter are adept at obscuring the overt aspects of their disorder.
They can speak without revealing to their speaking partner that they are a person who stutters,
effectively passing as fluent speakers. Due to the secret nature of their stuttering, they are said to
covertly stutter. These individuals are perhaps the best example that, at its core, the experience of
stuttering is something that is felt and experienced rather than something that can be observed
and measured by the listener (Moore & Perkins, 1990; Perkins, 1990).
Traditionally, passing has been attributed to pathological levels of social anxiety, moral
failing or weakness, or the internalization of social stigma (Brune & Wilson, 2013; Douglass &
Quarrington, 1952; Goffman, 1963). This paper will suggest that, although people pass for many
reasons, they do not always pass because of helplessness; rather, passing can represent an active
resistance to power rather than an acquiescence to it. To this end, contemporary understandings
of covert stuttering are discussed, the ethical theories of Michel Foucault are introduced, the
qualitative design of this study is described, and, finally, Foucault’s theories are used to
contextualize the experiences of people who pass as fluent and suggest an alternative
understanding of covert stuttering.
Covert Stuttering in the Literature
Only three empirical investigations have been conducted specifically with individuals
identified as passing as fluent. The first study suggested that people who pass as fluent (a) valued
4

maintaining their role as a fluent speaker over exchanging ideas via verbal communication, (b)
were less aware of their speech than people who do not pass, and (c) were more interested in
pleasing superiors than pleasing their peers (Kroll, 1978). The next two studies were
phenomenological investigations into the experience of passing as fluent. The first of these
identified a transition process of moving from covert to overt stuttering for two women who
stuttered (Douglass & Tetnowski, 2009). The second phenomenological investigation delved
more deeply into the process of coming out of the closet as a person who stutters (Douglass,
2011).
Despite the lack of empirical interest, covert stuttering has been mentioned in the
literature for more than a hundred years. Freund (1934) writes about this phenomenon
extensively, referencing works from the late nineteenth century (Denhardt, 1890; Ssikorsky,
1891). During the time of Freund’s writing, covert stuttering was usually referred to as ‘hidden’
or ‘masked’ stuttering. Authors contemporary with Freund included masked stuttering as an
advanced stage of developmental stuttering (Froeschels, 1948). Individuals in this stage tended
towards antisocial behavior resulting from a dominant need to hide their stuttering (Hoepfner,
1922). Stein (1942) characterized these individuals as having powerful feelings of inferiority and
anxiety that move the physical components of stuttering into the shadow of the psychological
components. In Freund’s 1934 article he called the phenomenon ‘inneres Stottern’ or interiorized
stuttering. This term is also used in the pioneering journal article on the topic by Douglass and
Quarrington (1952). The name interiorized stammering is still used today in the United Kingdom
(Cheasman, Everard, & Simpson, 2013). The United States has moved towards calling the
phenomenon covert stuttering, highlighting the hidden characteristics of the disorder (Murphy et
al., 2007).
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There have been several in-depth reviews of covert stuttering. The most well-known, by
Douglass and Quarrington (1952), suggested that the characteristics of people’s stuttering change
and develop over time. Covert stuttering, they posit, is the result of increasingly intricate and
elaborate avoidance strategies. They suggest that covert stuttering is more unpredictable than
overt and that people who covertly stutter prioritize fluency over other speaking goals, such as
communicating their thoughts and ideas. They also propose that people who covertly stutter are
more submissive, conforming, and anxious than their overt counterparts and that they place a
high value on climbing to the top of their social and professional hierarchies. Cheasman and
Everard (2013) point out that these characteristics are not unique to people who covertly stutter
and do not seem to differentiate them from people who overtly stutter.
Group therapy is often recommended for people who covertly stutter to reduce the
feelings of isolation that accompany passing (Cheasman & Everard, 2013; Levy, 1987). Murphy
et al. (2007) suggest that avoidance of stuttering can become such an ingrained part of a person’s
speech pattern that it can happen automatically, without an active decision to be covert. In
addition to the research and clinical literature, there are several published personal accounts of
covert stuttering that are instructive. They discuss using made up names during introductions
(Olish, 2009), limited job opportunities (Hood & Roach, 2001), dealing with the silence that
surrounds stuttering (Wesseling, 2011), and the physical toll the stress of passing can have on
one’s body (Dartnall, 2003; MacIntyre, 2012; Mertz, 2009; Reitzes, 2012).
Passing in the Literature
The characterization of the person who passes as fluent as a highly anxious individual
compelled to hide their stuttering at all costs has not changed much over the last century.
Although the literature describing covert stuttering is limited, that which does exist follows the
6

greater narrative of people who pass in other contexts. Passing has been defined as, “the
phenomenon in which a person of one social group identifies and represents herself as a member
of another or others” (Dawkins, 2012, pp. 8-9) or, “when people effectively present themselves
as other than who they understand themselves to be” (Kroeger, 2003, p. 7). Passing as fluent and
passing in general are seen as inherently negative pursuits (Douglass & Quarrington, 1952;
Froeschels, 1948; Hoepfner, 1922; Stein, 1942). It has been suggested that people who pass hold
excessively negative views towards their stuttering, have high levels of social anxiety, and spend
a great deal of energy hiding their stuttering from others (Douglass & Quarrington, 1952; Kroll,
1978; Levy, 1987; Murphy et al., 2007). People who covertly stutter are uncomfortable with their
real stuttering and therefore go to great lengths to hide and disguise it. Their fluency is a false
fluency, achieved by tricks and distractions. When viewed in this light, while people who pass as
fluent do not overtly stutter, they are not authentically fluent. Their true identity is of a person
who stutters, yet they present to the world as a fluent speaker.
This positions passing as a repression of one’s true self – in this case, one’s stuttering self
– due to either internal or external factors, or a combination of both (Brune & Wilson, 2013).
When due to internal factors, passing is seen as the result of pathological levels of shame, social
anxiety and poor self-esteem (Cox, 2013; Paterson, 2009). When due to external factors, passing
is seen as the unfortunate result of social oppression and stigma (Goffman, 1963). Both views
rest on the assumption that there is an authentic way to be – or, in the case of people who pass as
fluent, to speak – which people who pass violate. Passing becomes a diminishing of the authentic
self, an act of self-repression or self-betrayal (Garland-Thomson, 1997). People who pass are
condemned as liars and frauds (Samuels, 2003), “we accuse them of duplicity, of cowardice, of
not being themselves, of not fighting the good fight” (Kroeger, 2003, p. 2).
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Unfortunately, those who pass regularly report lower quality of life (Griffith & Hebl,
2002), increased health risks (Kalichman & Nachimson, 1999), and engage in exhausting and
inefficient behaviors to keep up their covert identity (Samuels, 2003). There are psychological
consequences to passing, such as shame, guilt, and role conflicts (Goffman, 1963; MacIntyre,
2012; Siebers, 2004). Consequences can also include secondary health impairments due to stress,
such as painful headaches and stomach ulcers as well as drastic reductions in agency and quality
of life (MacIntyre, 2012; Reitzes, 2012).
Passing in Context
Given that discrimination towards people with disabilities in general and people who
stutter in particular has been well documented in the literature (Campbell, 2001, 2009; Gabel,
2006; Klein & Hood, 2004b; Rice & Kroll, 1994, 2006; Tremain, 2005), it is possible that people
pass as fluent for reasons other than pathology and weakness. Passing may be more a symptom
of societal prejudice and less a symptom of personal failing (Kroeger, 2003). Following the late
philosopher Michel Foucault’s work on ethics (Foucault, 1978/1990, 1985/1990, 1986), it is
possible to position passing as fluent not as a diminishing of the authentic self, but as a specific
ethical relationship of the self with itself. Foucault argued that there is no authentic, natural, or
true self (Foucault, 1988a).There is only the ongoing process of self-creation, what he called the
production of the self. Foucault theorized that the self is always in relation with itself, acting on
itself to achieve specific ends. This relationship of the self with itself is achieved using specific
practices and always occurs in specific social and historical contexts. This paper will describe the
practices and contexts that produce covert stuttering.
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Theoretical Perspective: Foucault’s Ethics
Foucault defined ethics as the “self’s relationship to itself” (Davidson, 1987, p. 228); or
how one ought to conduct oneself as a subject of one’s own actions (Foucault, 1983a). A
person’s relationship with herself is just as rich and complex as her relationship with others.
Ethics is what an individual uses to regulate and mold himself into the type of being he thinks he
ought to be (Foucault, 1984/1997). In other words, what a person thinks, says, and does to
herself in order to construct a certain identity (Hacking, 1987). Foucault called these things
people say and do to themselves so as to attain a certain state of being the technologies of the self
(Foucault, 1982). People are always acting on themselves, altering who and what they are. One
iteration of self is no more authentic than any other; rather, it represents a different ethical
relationship.
The way people act relates to how they think. How people think relates to their
experiences. These experiences, in turn, relate to their social and historical situation (Foucault &
Martin, 1988). Different technologies of the self will exist in different times and places and,
therefore, Foucault’s ethics place heavy emphasis on the social environment in which experience
takes place. One always acts through relation with the environment and through relation with the
self (Foucault, 1985/1990). It is this relationship of the self with itself that leaves room for
agency within Foucault’s social framework and avoids social determinism. It is always the self
that acts; it is not being acted upon. Societal discourses do not force people to behave in certain
ways, instead they convince them that certain actions are the right way to behave. In most
situations people do not behave the way they do because they are forced to but because of their
own judgements of what is correct – because of their conscience (Hacking, 1987). Foucault’s
goal was to understand how individuals develop this conscience and turn themselves into
9

subjects (Foucault, 1983b); how they act on their own bodies, thoughts, and behaviors to
transform themselves to achieve certain ends. Therefore, to understand the ethics of passing one
must understand how people have been persuaded to pass, and once persuaded, how they
accomplish it (Foucault, 1982). What does the relationship of the person who covertly stutters
with herself and her environment look like?
Ethical relations are made up of historically situated ontological, deontological, ascetic,
and teleological elements (Robinson, 2011). Foucault calls the ontological element, the part of
the self that is identified as ethical, the ethical substance. The deontological element, the way
one comes to know what ought to be controlled, is called the mode of subjection. The ascetic
element, the things one says and does to oneself to be ethical, he calls the self-forming activities.
Finally, he calls the teleological element, the goal of acting ethically, the telos (Foucault,
1985/1990). The difference between distinct iterations of the self is not in their degree of
authenticity but in the way in which they were constituted. Different ethical substances, modes of
subjection, self-forming activities, and teloses will lead to different iterations of the self.
Foucault called the practices used to construct certain identities technologies of the self;
likewise, the practices used to construct certain communicative patterns can be called
technologies of communication. The many ways that people can stutter use different technologies
of communication. The practices people use when they stutter serve a purpose. They can be used
to disguise a stutter, as when interjections are used as a distraction. They can hide discomfort, as
when eye contact is broken. They can show ease with one’s disfluency, as when a speaker
stutters openly. They can show determination, as when a speaker perseveres through a long
block. Every moment of the stutter from the apprehension that precedes it, to the repeated
syllables during it, to the way it is reacted to when it ends, is constituted by and through
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technologies of communication. There is no authentic way to stutter; only different ways to
stutter that are produced through varied technologies of communication. Overt stuttering is no
more authentic than covert stuttering. Covert stuttering is not inauthentic stuttering but a form of
stuttering that is produced through the use of specific technologies of communication. These
technologies of communication are constituted by the unique ethical relation of the person who
stutters with herself. The purpose of this study is to understand the ethical self-relations people
use to pass as fluent.

Methodology and Method
Qualitative data was collected through semi-structured interviews with nine individuals
who pass as fluent. The goal of this study was to generate new meanings around the experience
of passing, not to make inferences about population-wise characteristics of people who pass –
which would have been impossible given the small sample size and absence of a control group.
The authors wished to avoid constructing an essential, monolithic covert stutterer and the
interviews did not seek the true or accurate representation of the experience of passing
(Mohanty, 1984). An authentic representation of an experience is unattainable because it is
nonexistent. The experience of passing as fluent is myriad; it always occurs in specific social and
historical contexts by individuals with specific ethnicities, genders, races, religions, ages,
sexualities, and disabilities. Instead of seeking an authentic, unified experience of passing, the
researchers sought ‘a creative interaction’ (Scheurich, 1995, p. 240) between interviewer and
interviewee in which each individual’s unique experience of passing could be understood
through the context of Foucault’s ethics. Consequently, the heterogeneity found in the data was
advantageous and allowed for a range of possible ideas and experiences of passing to be
11

recorded (Andre, 1981). Foucault’s ethical theories were used to understand these experiences in
a new, and hopefully more helpful, way.
Participants
After receiving university Institutional Review Board and National Stuttering Association
Research Committee approval, participants were recruited through self-help groups located
throughout the eastern United States. Recruitment also occurred through the Covert-S listserv, a
Yahoo group for people who covertly stutter. All participants were adults over 21 years old and
self-identified as individuals who passed as fluent in their everyday lives. Passing as fluent was
defined as the ability to hide stuttering to such an extent that others do not recognize it as
stuttering. Participants filled out the Overall Assessment of the Speaker’s Experience of
Stuttering for Adults (OASES-A; Yaruss & Quesal, 2010) before each interview. Participants are
referred to by pseudonyms that they were invited to choose, see Table 1. All interviews were
conducted by the first author, in person, face-to-face, and recorded using two handheld digital
recorders (a Sony ICD-PX820 and Olympus VN-7100). Interviews averaged 106.08 minutes in
length (ranging from 56.30 minutes to 143.57 minutes).
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Table 1.
Participant Demographics
OASES-A
Pseudonym

Gender

Age

Race/
Ethnicity

State

Occupation

Impact
Rating

Impact
Score

Interview
length
(h:mm:ss)

Herod

Male

73

White

Tennessee

Retired librarian

Mild/
Moderate

1.71

2:01:16

Serenity

Female

51

African
American

Tennessee

Moderate

2.69

2:23:34

Rose

Female

19

White

Moderate

2.65

0:56:18

ChaCha

Male

28

South
Asian

New
York
New
York

Engineer

Severe

3.95

1:40:25

Parker

Female

27

White

Massachusetts

Mild/
Moderate

1.88

1:44:47

Blue

Female

27

White

Speech-Language
Pathologist
Business
Consultant

Moderate

2.77

1:27:03

Veronica

Female

30

White

3.21

2:17:28

Bear

Male

29

White

Missouri

Social Worker

2.23

1:45:25

Mattie

Female

25

African
American

Missouri

Accountant

2.61

1:38:26

New
York
North
Carolina

Self-employed:
Taxes/Accounting
Undergraduate
Student

PhD Student

Moderate/
Severe
Mild/
Moderate
Moderate

Note: OASES-A = Overall Assessment of the Speaker’s experience of Stuttering for Adults (Yaruss & Quesal, 2010).

This study raised questions about gender and passing. Approximately four times as many
adult males as females stutter (Bloodstein & Bernstein Ratner, 2008; Yairi & Ambrose, 2005).
Yet two thirds of the participants in this study were female. Caution is needed in interpreting this
result considering the small number of participants in the study. It is possible that the subject
selection procedures biased the sample towards female participation. Anecdotally, the gender
ratio appears to be different in people who pass as fluent compared to people who stutter in
general, as also noted by Cheasman and Everard (2013).
The Interviews
Semi-structured interviews were used to learn about the technologies of communication
employed by the individuals in this study to produce covert stuttering (Graham, 1984; Gubrium
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& Holstein, 2003; Oakley, 1972; Reinharz, 1992; Scheurich, 1995, 1997). These interviews were
conducted using an interview guide that was heavily imbued with Foucault’s ethical theories
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Jackson & Mazzei, 2012). The interview guide was split into four
parts with questions addressing each component of Foucault’s ethics. The theoretical
underpinnings of the interview guide were not inconsequential as the theoretical perspective one
works from has material consequences for the data collected (Heckman, 2010). See the
Appendix for the interview guide questions.
Each section of the interview had lead questions that were asked to all participants.
Follow-up questions for the lead questions were listed on the interview guide to help the
interviewer stay on task. The conversation was allowed to develop freely. It was essential that
the participants and their experiences guided the interviews and not the authors’ preconceived
ideas of what passing as fluent was. The interview was not conducted like a survey, what Ezzy
(2010) calls a ‘data conquest;’ rather, the interview guide was used to structure a ‘true dialogue’
(Bristow & Esper, 1988, p. 67) around passing as fluent.
Interviewing is more than a simple one-on-one conversation because the interviewer acts
as the instrument of data collection as well as a member of the conversational dyad (Benney &
Hughes, 1970; Goode & Hatt, 1952). The interviewer as a tool is never without measurement
bias; the subjectivity of the first author and his exposure to, and understanding of, Foucault’s
theories interacted with the subjectivity of the participants in each interview and, therefore, every
interview unfolded differently. Not only can a question or answer mean something entirely
different to the interviewer than to the interviewee, but both may change over time and in
different situations. Therefore, the data collected in a specific interview are always contingent on
the specific interviewer, interviewee, place, time, and date (Scheurich, 1995). Interviews, much
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like therapy, are not static processes that can be standardized and repeated but are unique and
dynamic (Coleman, Miller, & Weidner, 2015; Graham, 1984; Oakley, 1972; Reinharz, 1992;
Wampold & Imel, 2015; Yaruss, Coleman, & Quesal, 2012). Interviewing is fundamentally
subjective (Enosh, Ben-Ari, & Buchbinder, 2008).
Even though the interviews were participant-led, the relationship between the interviewee
and interviewer was not entirely non-hierarchical and egalitarian (Jackson, 2003). It is
impossible for the authors of this paper to transparently speak for the participants or to capture
their authentic voices (Foucault & Deleuze, 1972/1977; Spivak, 1994/1988; Trinh, 1989). After
all, it is the understanding of the authors that would structure the presentation and interpretation
of the results of this research (Edwards, 1990). Trust was built between participants and
interviewer by acknowledging this power differential before each interview began. Even though
they were the experts on their experience of passing as fluent, it was made known to them that
ultimately it was the understanding of the authors which would direct the analysis and write up
of the manuscript. Member checking was used to ensure that all participants approved of the
final draft of this paper.
Data Analysis
After the interviews were completed, the recordings were transcribed verbatim. To ensure
reliability, transcripts were reread while listening to the recordings by the first and second author
and adjusted until no changes needed to be made. Field notes were taken before and after each
interview, and a research journal and procedural memos were kept continuously during the study
(DeWalt & DeWalt, 2010; Ortlipp, 2008; Richardson & St Pierre, 2005). All of these documents,
as well as Foucault’s ethical writings, were used in the analysis (Lather & St Pierre, 2013; St.
Pierre & Jackson, 2014). The process of creating these documents, that is the writing itself, was
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an important part of the analytic process which fostered novel thoughts and ideas that would not
have otherwise come about (Richardson & St Pierre, 2005). As recommended by Foucault and
Deleuze (1972/1977), Foucault’s ethical theories were used as the ‘box of tools’ (p. 208) with
which the data were analyzed. Foucault’s ethics provided the context through which to
understand the experience of passing as fluent, a process known as ‘plugging in’ (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1987; Jackson & Mazzei, 2012).
The process of data analysis for each participant was standardized. The first step was to
orient to the data. After an interview was transcribed and passed the reliability checks, the first
author read through the transcript. Then the first author read through each transcript again and
took notes relating the data to Foucault’s components of ethics. The second step was to identify
the theory in the data. To do this, each transcript was read again, and occurrences of the ethical
component of interest were noted and commented on. This was done for each of the four
components of ethics. All these notes were combined into standalone documents for each
component of ethics for each participant, yielding four documents for each participant. The third
step was to plug the data into the theory. This involved reading through each document of
extracted data and writing about the ethical relations at play. The data was used as context to
write about and explain the theory. Likewise, the theory was used as context to write about and
explain the data.
Once this was done for each ethical component for each participant, all the notes and
memos, with their supporting quotes, were merged into one document for each component of
ethics. This fifth step was called the data aggregation step. Step six was a repeat of step three,
plug the data into the theory, however, this time the data from all participants was used. The data
was again used to write about and explain the theory and the theory was again used to write
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about and explain the data. The last step, step seven, was the thematic analysis. All the notes and
their corresponding data were organized into similar units. This was done until all the data was
ordered into a hierarchical set of themes for each of the ethical categories. All the themes were
supported by direct quotes from the data. Table 2 shows a summary of this procedure.
Table 2.
The Data Analysis Process
I.
For Each Participant Individually
1. Orient to Data
i. Read transcript
ii. Read transcript again and take notes on sections relating to Foucault’s components of
ethics
2. Identify Theory in Data
i. For each component of ethics (ethical substance, mode of subjection, self-forming
activities, telos)
1. Read transcript again
2. Highlight and comment on all instances of ethical compenent
3. Copy all these notes and quotes into separate document
a. Each participant will have a document for each component of ethics
3. Plug Data Into Theory
i. Read through each document of extracted data
ii. Write about the ethical relations at play
1. Use the data to write about and explain the theory
2. Use the theory to write about and explain the data
iii. These notes, written memos, and quoted data are further organized and refined
II.
For All Participants Combined
5. Data Aggregation
i. Merge notes and memos, supported by quotes, from the data for each participant, into
a separate document for each ethical substance
1. There are now four documents, one for each ethical component with the
combined data from all participants
6. Plug Data into Theory
i. Read through each document of aggregated data
ii. Write about the ethical relations at play
1. Use the data to write about and explain the theory
2. Use the theory to write about and explain the data
iii. These notes, written memos, and quoted data are further organized and refined
7. Thematic Analysis
i. Organize data for each ethical category into themes
1. All themes must be supported by direct quotes from data

Discussion of Results: Practices of Passing
In this section the data collected through the interviews are contextualized through
Foucault’s four ethical categories: the ethical substance, that part of themselves people take to be
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of ethical consequence; the mode of subjection, the rules to which people adhere; the selfforming activities, the things people actually do to themselves; and the telos, what people hope to
accomplish by acting ethically (Foucault, 1983a). The participants’ data are referred to by their
pseudonymous source either directly in the text or in parenthetical citations. All names of friends
and family members are pseudonyms as well. The number of participants that contributed to
themes and subthemes are identified in subtitles.
Ethical Substance
The first part of Foucault’s framework is the ethical substance, the part of oneself and
one’s behavior that must be controlled to pass as fluent. The ethical substance is the material that
is to be molded by ethics, the part of one’s self that is managed in order to be ethical.
The Act of Stuttering (n=9)
There were two main ethical substances identified by the participants. The first, the act of
stuttering, was shared by all the participants. Herod said of his stuttering, “It was kind of
embarrassing, it was a defect I had. And I would have rather not had it”. ChaCha described his
stuttering as a “very bad thing”. The distinction between stuttered speech and fluent speech is far
from clear (Bloodstein & Shogan, 1972; Kelly & Conture, 1988; Moore & Perkins, 1990;
Perkins, 1990; Tuthill, 1940, 1946; Yaruss, 1997b). By deciding where the boundary was
between fluency and stuttering, each participant produced her or his own idea of what was
acceptable. The act of stuttering is distinct from the feeling of stuttering, the participants were
clear that even if they did not produce disfluent speech they still felt the underlying loss of
control that accompanies the stutter (Herod). The feeling of stuttering was often impossible to
avoid but the act of stuttering was amenable to change.
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Identification as a Stutterer (n=3)
The second ethical substance was the identification as a stutterer. Unlike the act of
stuttering, identification as a stutterer only emerged as an ethical substance for Bear, Blue, and
ChaCha. The other participants were comfortable sharing that they stuttered even though they
avoided the physical act of stuttering (Rose, Veronica, Parker, Serenity, & Mattie). After a
noticeable stutter, Serenity would say, “It’s a bad stuttering day!” and Parker would exclaim,
“Whoah! I’m stuttering like crazy today!” Nonetheless, some of the participants wished to keep
the very fact that they had ever stuttered a secret. For these participants, their stuttering felt like a
“really dark secret” (Bear) that caused them so much shame they would “rather go jump off a
building than identify as a stutterer” (Blue). Throughout her life, Blue only told two people that
she stuttered. These individuals felt compelled to control their image as a fluent speaker. Any
indication to their listener that they might stutter or have stuttered was an existential threat to this
image.
Mode of Subjection
The next component of ethics is the mode of subjection, this is how the ethical substance
comes to be recognized as something that could/should be controlled in the first place (Foucault,
1983a). The mode of subjection is what the individual is using to internalize concerns about the
ethical substance. This often relates to what they take as being relevant Truth about the ethical
substance. How did the participants come to learn that the act of stuttering and the identification
as a stutterer were ethical substances and how did they learn where to draw their boundaries?
Modes of subjection are often taught through social upbringing and experience (Foucault,
1983a). The main mode of subjection for the participants in this study were their experiences.
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Specifically, they experienced stigmatization, bullying, teasing, and discrimination. These
experiences all had the effect of delegitimizing their stutters.
Delegitimization is the identification and exclusion of selected individuals or groups from
society (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Clabaugh & Rozycki, 1997). The effect of delegitimization
is the reduction of agency and the withdrawal of legitimacy. Agency is the capacity of an
individual to act based on choice rather than coercion through social or environmental impetus
(Constantino & Manning, 2016). Delegitimization reduces agency by limiting the subject
positions individuals can take on, the actions they can take, and the choices they can make. In
short, delegitimization limits the type of person one can be. It is possible to distinguish between
two types of delegitimization in the experiences of the participants, direct and indirect.
Direct delegitimization occurs when another’s actions intentionally have the effect of
taking agency away from an individual. Previous research has shown that many people who
stutter are bullied and teased during childhood and adolescents (Blood & Blood, 2004; Blood,
Blood, Tellis, & Gabel, 2003; Stephen Davis, Peter Howell, & Frances Cooke, 2002; Erickson &
Block, 2013; Langevin & Prasad, 2012), and experience discrimination in adulthood (Klein &
Hood, 2004b; Rice & Kroll, 1994, 2006). These would all constitute forms of direct
delegitimization.
Indirect delegitimization occurs when another’s actions do not intend to but, nonetheless
have the effect of taking agency away from an individual. Previous research has shown that
listener behavior changes in response to hearing stuttering (Boehmler, 1958; Burley & Rinaldi,
1986; Panico, Healey, Brouwer, & Susca, 2005; Rosenberg & Curtiss, 1954) and that societal
norms stigmatize stuttering (Blood et al., 2003; Boyle & Blood, 2015; Boyle, 2013, 2015;
Corcoran & Stewart, 1998; Woods, 1978). Skin conductance studies have shown implicit
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emotional and physiological responses in people listening to stuttered speech (Guntupalli, Erik
Everhart, Kalinowski, Nanjundeswaran, & Saltuklaroglu, 2007; Guntupalli, Kalinowski,
Nanjundeswaran, Saltuklaroglu, & Everhart, 2006; Zhang, Kalinowski, Saltuklaroglu, &
Hudock, 2010). These would all constitute forms of indirect delegitimization. The participants’
response to delegitimization was pragmatic: they had past experiences in which their manner of
speaking was denied legitimacy, and they wished to avoid this consequence in the future.
Direct Delegitimization (n=9)
Often direct delegitimization took the form of a punishment for stuttering. As Foucault
(1977) notes, punishment does not simply work on one’s body, like torture, but rather takes as a
target the whole person in order to alter and change him or her. Participants were bullied as
children by their peers (Parker) as well as by adults (Parker, ChaCha, Serenity, & Mattie).
ChaCha recalled being told by primary school teachers that his speech was “very bad” and
“something was wrong with him”. His teachers knew that he stuttered and avoided calling on
him. He recalled that this directly delegitimized his role as a student, “So what happened is that it
labeled in my head that I’m incapable of doing something which requires talking. So, I shouldn’t
have been overt about it, I should have been more covert.” He said, “It kind of labels me as
someone who is incapable.” When she was unable to tell something to her teacher, Parker was
told, “Well if you have nothing to say why don’t you take the bus home, go go go talk to your
mother about it”. Serenity described a particularly painful memory of raising her hand to answer
a question as a young girl in class. When called on she could not answer; while she was
blocking, the teacher mocked her saying, “I can’t hear you”. This happened for some time;
eventually Serenity learned not to stutter in class.
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Direct delegitimization did not stop after childhood. As adults, the participants were
mocked, imitated, and laughed at (Serenity, Rose, Mattie, & Bear). They had family members
tell them not to talk if they were going to stutter (ChaCha). Potential employers told them they
could not hire them because they stuttered (Mattie & Bear). Employers removed them from their
positions or told them not to use the phone when they found out they stuttered (Serenity). After a
humble, rural upbringing, ChaCha is now a successful engineer working in a large city for a
Fortune 500 company. However, when he returns home, people from his hometown still tell him,
“Oh you are doing great in the [big city] but you cannot even speak properly!” After overhearing
him stutter a family member exclaimed, “Oh my God, you’re twenty now and you’re still
speaking like a four-year-old kid, that’s bad. You should kind of do something you know,
seriously.” Mattie had a date tell her “to just be quiet” when she stuttered, and another tell her he
was not interested because she “couldn’t talk anyway.” ChaCha was told by a date that he was,
“a jerk because of the way [he] speaks,” and that he spoke, “like a psycho.” She demanded that
he speak “normal” and when he could not she walked out of the restaurant. All of these
experiences, taken together, serve to convince the person who stutters that they should alter
themselves in order to avoid further punishment (Foucault, 1977).
Indirect Delegitimization (n=9)
The participants also experienced indirect delegitimization. These were actions that were
not meant to but, nonetheless, had the effect of taking agency away from an individual. Indirect
delegitimization frequently came in the form of unsolicited altruism. Participants often had
people finish their sentences, “because they think that that’s what you want them to do” (Rose)
or, “they considered it their job” (Herod). This altruism also came in the form of rewarded
fluency (ChaCha). These obvious attempts to be helpful are significant because they position
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speaking with a stutter as an inferior way of speaking requiring the patience and help of the
listener. Unfortunately, if the person speaking had not indicated that they are in distress or in
need of assistance, then attempts by their listeners to help them serve to delegitimize their way of
speaking (Veronica). It positioned their speaking as inferior and in need of help. As Veronica put
it, people assume that when they hear stuttering, “The person who is speaking is uncomfortable”
or in distress.
The participants explained that altruism and sympathy were often just as disabling as
mocking and overt discrimination. ChaCha said that when people, attempting to be sympathetic,
stopped asking him to do things that required speaking, he was rendered incapable. Another
message implicit in some altruism (i.e. advice) was that, as Herod put it, “if you had enough selfcontrol you wouldn’t stutter.” People told Herod, “If you just slowed down, you could avoid it.”
People offered such simplistic and demeaning advice as “slow down”, “take a deep breath”, and
“you don’t have to be nervous”. Every time someone gives advice to a person who stutters it
positions the disability inside the individual, suggesting stuttering is an issue of self-control
(Herod & Serenity). Instead of requiring the person listening to be more patient, the person
speaking needs to think about what it is they want to say or slow down (Veronica). Serenity felt
that there is an expectation within society that people who stutter “work on their speech” and “try
to talk normal.”
In addition to displays of altruism, the participants were indirectly delegitimized by
displays of discomfort. The participants called this the look. As a gesture, the look creates a
hierarchical and oppressive relationship between the speaker and listener by framing the person
who stutters’ way of speaking as deviant and startling (Garland-Thomson, 1997). Mattie
translated the look to be asking, “What is wrong with her?” Mattie and ChaCha said people with
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whom they are speaking sometimes become angry when they stutter. They said the looks results
from stuttering bringing people face-to-face with disability in a surprising and violent manner.
People who stutter initially present as no different from other people, and their disfluencies can
come as a shock to their conversational partners. The participants said that stuttering forces the
person they are speaking with to feel unwelcome empathy and pity (Mattie, Veronica, & Rose).
Herod read the irritated look as saying, “You’re making me feel bad about your stuttering.”
The participants were also delegitimized by societal discourse. There is a tremendous
amount of taboo, silence, and stigma surrounding stuttering (Veronica). Some participants were
quite sure no one knew they stuttered, since no one had mentioned it, even their parents (Bear &
Blue). Rather than represent an absence of discourse about stuttering, silence is a critical and
meaningful part of the discourse (Mazzei, 2007). This silence had consequences for the
participants and served specific discursive functions (MacLure, 2013). It suggested to the
participants that there was something contrary and unmentionable about their stuttering
(MacLure, Holmes, Jones, & MacRae, 2010). This silence, especially from loved ones, implied
that stuttering was not proper to discuss and was the source of much of the participants’ shame
(Blue & Herod).
The participants mentioned the existence of speech therapy programs that claimed to be
able to cure stuttering as another source of indirect delegitimization. Veronica explained, “I think
that I always knew that those options for therapy were available … so I always, in the back of
my head, thought, well there are techniques, but I failed at them”. The advertisement of a cure
reinforces the discourse that the reason someone stutters is that they are not doing the right things
in order not to stutter. To have gone to speech therapy and to stutter still is to be a failure
(ChaCha). Bear expressed this as a feeling of guilt, “clearly there’s something wrong because
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you’ve gone to speech therapy and you’ve learned these things and you’re just not doing things
right, so you should feel bad about that.” In other words, there are techniques that cure stuttering
available; therefore, if you still stutter it is your fault. The public is affected by this discourse as
well. Mattie says people, “think that stuttering is fixable. They think it’s not permanent because
other people have stopped stuttering.” Speech therapy programs claiming to cure stuttering lead
the public to blame people who continue to stutter for not taking their problem seriously
(Veronica, Bear, & Mattie). Bear thinks, “Society views it as a real quick fix, so why not just fix
it?” Society is impatient with stuttering because they see it as something easily repaired.
Self-Forming Activities
Convinced by the mode of subjection of the benefits of passing, the participants separated
their stuttering from the rest of their identities and attempted to control it. How they
accomplished this is the domain of the self-forming activities, the next component of ethics
(Foucault, 1983a). These are what people do to control the ethical substance in order to change
themselves; these are the actual practices individuals use to pass as fluent (Foucault, 1983a,
1985/1990).
The participants’ discipline is what ultimately allowed for passing. Their self-forming
activities, rather than specific actions used at specific times, represented a gestalt way of
speaking and communicating, a gestalt way of being. The techniques used were numerous and
ubiquitous, influencing almost every aspect of the participants’ communication. Covert stuttering
is often thought of as a passive activity accomplished mostly through inaction; however, most of
the self-forming activities were intentional and active. These were disciplinary techniques
employed by the speakers in order to increase the utility of their speech (Foucault, 1977). Some
of the participants were adamant about refuting the stereotype of the covert stutterer who avoids
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speaking and participating in life activities (Parker & Blue). They saw themselves as successful
and actively engaged with the world. Their ability to pass was due to their skill and diligence not
to extreme avoidance alone. Most of the participants would claim to be able to say what they
wanted to say when they wanted to say it, albeit with some modification. Some of the
participants had a sense of pride in their ability to pass (Blue, Rose, & Parker). Far from being
passive and at the mercy of their stuttering, the participants actively manipulated their speaking
experiences to navigate their environments.
Much of what the participants did to pass was similar to therapy techniques known to
increase fluency, complicating the binary between overt and covert stuttering. They would
stretch the first sound in a word, make sure to use proper air flow, use easy onsets (begin airflow
before the first sound of a word, easing into the voicing), use continuous phonation, use pauses
and phrasing, and control their pace (Rose, Bear, Serenity, & Parker). Serenity would talk in a
breathy, low, monotone voice. Other participants would use relaxation exercises and positive
self-talk to keep their “body’s state in a place that’s conducive to fluency” (Parker) and to keep
their anxiety down (ChaCha & Parker). Taking advantage of the increased fluency singing brings
(Bloodstein & Bernstein Ratner, 2008), Blue would sometimes sing what she wanted to say
when she was a child. Several participants changed the affect in their voices or took on alternate
personas, similar to the stage voices used by actors (Bear & Veronica).
Prediction (n=9)
To pass, the participants first had to predict when they would stutter. Often participants
had a history of stuttering on frequently used words, such as their names (Serenity, Veronica,
Herod, Blue, Mattie, Bear & ChaCha) or hometowns (Herod, ChaCha, Rose, & Blue). Other
times, participants knew certain high information words, such as an item off a menu or the name
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of a book during a book report, were likely to be stuttered and alternative words could be thought
up well in advance of saying the words out loud (Herod). However, in most conversations this
advanced foresight was not available. Participants would only have a few milliseconds before a
feared, difficult word to react. Surprisingly, most of the participants did not think this was a
challenging task. Blue, Rose, and Mattie all cited their large vocabularies as making this easy.
They found that when they thought they would stutter on a word they could easily think of an
alternative word to say. They may not have said something exactly as they originally intended
but it would still make sense and convey the gist of their thought.
Real-time adjustments (n=9):
When asked how they could predict what words they would stutter on many were unable
to operationalize this process. Some participants would cite a feeling that they were going to
stutter. ChaCha describes getting an “intuition”. Parker said she felt her way forward while
speaking, much like someone walking down a dark hallway with arms outstretched. She did not
predict when she would stutter but instead reacted to the internal feeling of stuttering, “I will stop
the very millisecond that I feel the stutter.” Similarly, Blue said this feeling was her indicator to
change words. As she thought of new words to say she would have an analogous corporeal
reaction to them,
I can feel like, in my throat wanting to get tight at the thought of saying different words.
And not that it is [actually getting tight], because I’m able to speak as I’m thinking these
things. So, my mind is constantly going about what I’m gonna say next, what words,
whether I just get the gut feeling that I’m gonna block on it and then I try a different
word. (Blue)
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Detailed planning (n=2)
In contrast to making on-the-fly adjustments to their speech, two of the participants
actively planned out what they were going to say. Blue could tell she would stutter on a word
just by thinking about it. Rose described her planning process in great detail,
I always had this thing in my mind where when I speak I can see the sentences in the
front of my mind… a couple of sentences [in advance] … I kind of see it and I am able,
as if it’s written on paper I can like cross it out and move it around…it’s like spatial
sequencing synesthesia or something….my alphabet is in a grid but it’s not in order and I
realize that the letters that are out of order are the letters that I have trouble saying…in
my mind … its white type face on like just a black background… And it’s just a lot of
really fast thinking and my mind just kind of constantly like alright next word, next word,
next word
Instead of reacting to the words as they come, Rose planned her sentences in advance around the
words she thought would be easiest to say.
Manipulation (n=9)
Once participants knew when they were going to stutter the next step to passing was to
either manipulate the stutter or avoid it altogether.
Word Manipulation (n=9)
The manipulation of words was a ubiquitous part of the experience of passing. Subtle
changes were made, such as saying “prior” instead of “before” or “recall” instead of “remember”
(Bear). In the past, Veronica had introduced herself with a fake name, while Serenity usually
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introduced herself with her last name. To avoid saying the area of the city in which they lived,
the participants named areas they lived near or the named close by landmarks (Rose, Bear, Blue).
When ChaCha takes public transportation or a taxi, he gets off at a place he can say and then
walks the rest of the way. Herod had a humorous story of hitchhiking, “I got a ride in a truck,
and the guy said, ‘Where are you going?’ and I said, ‘Well, I’ll tell you when we get there.’ And
I did! We went through the town and I said, ‘I’ll just get out here.’”
Some participants combined words to create neologisms that could be easily said
fluently. Parker gave a vivid example of this. She sometimes struggled with words that began
with vowels. When she thought a word that began with a vowel would give her trouble, she
combined it with the last consonant sound of the previous word. For example, “If I were to say,
‘Hey Emily’, in my mind, I shifted it to say, ‘Hey Yemily’. So, her name is no longer ‘Emily’ her
name is ‘Yemily’.” Another example Parker gave was instead of asking, “Can you call the local
movie theatre to find out what movies are playing,” she would ask, “Can you call the local movie
theatre to find dout what movies zare playing.” This change is imperceptible to the listener.
Mattie used a similar strategy of combing difficult words. She often had trouble saying her name
during introductions, instead of saying, “Hi I’m Mattie,” she would, “blend it all into one big
word, like you know, ‘HiImMattie’”.
Sentence Manipulation (n=9)
The participants added sounds or words to their speech that they knew they would be able
to say fluently. These were often used as starter sounds or as placeholders “to buy some time”
until they felt they could say something fluently (Blue). Typically, these additions were
interjections that all speakers use in their speech, such as uh, um, and like (Herod & Mattie).
Veronica used a slight croaking sound in her throat. These interjections help them to “ride the
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wave of fluency” that they bring (Bear). When speaking about these interjections, Blue said that,
“I feel a lot of people who are fluent do that, so I don’t feel any different from them.” Rose
agreed with Blue that interjections are one of the techniques that, “passes as the most normal.”
Content Manipulation (n=9)
Stuttering and attempts to hide it affected much of the content of the participants’ speech.
Many participants had rote phrases that they could say fluently, such as a routine phrase used to
introduce themselves or answer the phone (Blue, Mattie, & Bear). Herod said his sense of humor
took “the form of a wise crack, a quick retort, kind of a witty observation” because he was afraid
if he told jokes or stories he “might stutter on the punchline and then ruin the whole thing.” As
Serenity put it, “Keep in mind I’ve been stuttering over forty years. You learn a lot of tricks over
forty-something years.” These tricks varied from practicing what they were going to say under
their breath or in their heads (Herod, Blue, & Parker) to using body language (e.g. a flick of the
hair) to distract a speaking partner from noticing stuttering (Blue). The participants often risked
anti-social behavior, such as not saying thank you, greeting people, and introducing oneself, to
avoid stuttering (Blue, Bear, Herod, ChaCha, & Veronica)
Sound Manipulation (n=9):
One of the most common methods of passing was to disguise stutters as normal
disfluencies. As Parker said, “I’ve just gotten really good at hiding it and changing the way I say
things, in a way that sounds normally disfluent … It just sounded like something I would do if I
was stressed or talking too fast. So, I think I found a way to stutter like typical people stutter.”
Serenity said that everyone gets caught on words, if she “can smooth it out and keep going,
[she’s] talking like everybody else.” Veronica will sometimes exhale her air when she starts to
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stutter, “I guess I am still stuttering but it does not come across as like a typical stutter… it isn’t
perceived as a stutter.” Likewise, Herod said his stuttering is a “form of stuttering that doesn’t
result in an obvious stutter,” such as, “changing words, substituting phrases in there, being quite
at times.”
Avoidance (n=9)
The avoidance strategies of people who stutter, both overt and covert, have been well
documented in the literature (Riley, Riley, & Maguire, 2004; Sheehan, 1953, 1968, 1970, 1975;
Sheehan & Sisskin, 2001; Sisskin & Baer, 2013). The participants in this study also avoided
words, people, and situations when moments of stuttering could not be disguised. ChaCha would
tell friends he could not come out because he was sick and tell coworkers he was busy with work
and could not talk. Frequently, participants would act as if they had forgotten the word they were
saying or were still thinking through what they wanted to say (Mattie, ChaCha, Blue, Rose, &
Veronica). Avoidance was often subtle. For example, many of the participants would not take
part in an activity as fully as they would have liked or would shorten their explanations of things
to reduce the chance of stuttering (Mattie, Herod, & Veronica).
Other times avoidance was more flagrant. Mattie would avoid answering the phone and
ChaCha skipped work meetings. Authority figures (Rose, Veronica, & ChaCha), large groups
(Mattie), and members of the opposite sex (Herod) were often avoided. Blue frequently
pretended to forget what she was saying, even when doing so was highly unusual: she once told
her mom a friend was coming over, but she could not recall which one. Ten minutes later, when
she felt she could say her friend’s name fluently, she told her mom she remembered. Blue
wanted to make clear that even though she avoided stuttering she still, eventually, said what she
wanted to say and communicated clearly. Several of the participants would employ similar
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strategies, stalling until they felt they could say the words fluently. Mattie was at a wedding and
a few people asked her where she got her dress, “I acted like that I couldn’t remember and then I
told her like when I could finally get it out.”
Telos
The telos is what a person hopes to accomplish by controlling the ethical substance
(Foucault, 1983a, 1985/1990). This is the goal of the technologies of self. For the participants in
this study, the telos was the goal of passing. In other words, why do people who stutter pass as
fluent? All ethical acts tend toward an accomplishment, they have a goal (Foucault, 1985/1990).
For all the participants (n=9), the main objective in passing was to secure the advantages that
come with being perceived as able-bodied; they sought to shed the stigma of disability (Herod).
This taken-for-granted advantage can be called able-bodied privilege (Du Bois, 1903; McIntosh,
1988). The self-forming activities all lead coherently to this goal (Foucault, 1983a). Passing as
fluent allowed the participants to escape the delegitimization that accompanies being perceived
as disabled and access the advantages of assumed able-bodiedness (Ginsberg, 1996).
Mattie said by passing as fluent she is, “trying to achieve, with [her] speech at least, a
universal norm.” Rose also discussed the idea that, “there’s this kind of overall category of being
normal.” People perceived as normal can take advantage of the assumptions that come with
perceived able-bodiedness. Since the passer is granted these privileges up until the moment she
stutters, she is not asking for privileges not yet realized but to keep privileges she has already
received, privileges which would be taken away if she should cease to pass (Kroeger, 2003). The
right not to have your identity pathologized or interrogated is the essence of able-bodied
privilege – not to have anyone ask, “What is wrong with you?” (Mattie). When asked why it is
attractive to speak more fluently, Serenity answered,
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To be like everybody else. I know we shouldn’t try to be like everybody else, we should
try to enjoy our differences. But, being black, that’s another difference. Being Muslim,
that’s a difference. Being a woman, that’s a difference. And stuttering on top of that? And
then over-weight on top of that? No, that, all of that, it’s too many.
Being deemed able-bodied comes with certain assumptions. Able-bodied individuals are
assumed to be sane. Serenity explained that she does not want people, “to think I have some sort
of mental disability because of my stuttering.” Herod felt that others assumed that he was
intelligent; however, the moment he stuttered his intellect was called into question. Another
assumption of able-bodiedness is skill and competency. Participants worried that their stutter
would cause their coworkers and superordinates to, “perceive [them] as slow or incompetent or
not able to work just as well as [their] counterparts” (Mattie). Professionals are required to have
excellent communication skills and to have excellent communication one must be fluent
(ChaCha & Bear).
The identities a person can take on are categorical and depend on social and historical
context (Foucault, 1977, 1988b). Rose explained that people operate in social situations using
heuristics to categorize others. Up until the moment she stutters she is put in the “normal”
category; however, the moment she stutters she is put in another category, she becomes disabled.
It is not the presence of absence of her stuttering that disables her but her listener’s awareness of
it. If she stutters and her listener does not notice, she is not disabled. When the participants
struggled with their speech, they fulfilled the public’s expectation of how people who stutter
speak. Stumbling in speech leads to stumbling into other identity categories and subject positions
because it makes passing impossible (Chandler, 2010; Kafer, 2013). The act of stuttering
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produces an ontological break, through which the participant falls into a different category of
person.
Summary of technologies of communication
People with disabilities in general and people who stutter in particular are at a
disadvantage in contemporary society (Campbell, 2001, 2009; Gabel, 2006; Klein & Hood,
2004b; Rice & Kroll, 1994, 2006; Tremain, 2005). People who stutter are often viewed
negatively by listeners (Allard & Williams, 2008; Craig, Tran, & Craig, 2003; MacKinnon, Hall,
& MacIntyre, 2007; St. Louis, 2005; St. Louis, Reichel, Yaruss, & Lubker, 2009), experience
discrimination in the form of mocking, bullying, decreased income, limited career choice, and
limited professional advancement (Blood & Blood, 2004; Blood et al., 2003; Blood et al., 2011;
Blumgart, Tran, & Craig, 2010; S. Davis, P. Howell, & F. Cooke, 2002; Gabel, Blood, Tellis, &
Althouse, 2004; Klein & Hood, 2004b), are portrayed negatively in the media (Johnson, 2008),
and internalize this stigma (Boyle, 2013). In this context, passing as fluent has traditionally been
understood as a repression of an authentic self because of helplessness in the face of societal
stigma and pathological levels of social anxiety and shame (Brune & Wilson, 2013; Douglass &
Quarrington, 1952; Goffman, 1963; Levy, 1987). The data collected in this study suggest that
passing is more usefully understood as a form of resistance by people who stutter to a hostile
society.
Societal expectations of fluency do not exert supreme domination over people who
stutter; there is always room for resistance within power relations. Foucault’s (1978/1990)
theories suggest that power does not merely emanate from those in dominant positions to
suppress subordinates but also comes from those in subjugated positions. Power is not held by
any one person or group but rather emerges from unequal relations between people and groups.
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The subjugated find numerous, imaginative, and sometimes forceful ways to resist injustice
(Scheurich, 1995). Power can never operate with complete facility but is always checked by
those it attempts to act on. Since power is never total there is always room to resist the ways in
which one has been constituted (Sawicki, 1991). It is the agency of people who pass as fluent
that allows for this space of resistance; power, “will be open to erosion and undercutting by the
active, embodied agency of those people who are its object” (Clegg, 1989, p. 193).
Passing as fluent resembles other forms of minority passing, where individuals of a
discriminated minority attempt to pass as a member of the majority. Passing is both a means of
securing power and a means of exerting power. To pass is to manipulate the conventional use of
rhetoric and performance to access privilege that would otherwise be denied (Dawkins, 2012).
People who pass as fluent secure a space within which they have some control over how they are
defined by others and the opportunities available to them (Scheurich, 1995). The participants in
this study were not passively resigned to their designation as stutterers and to accept the
prejudices of society. The practices they employed were active engagements with their
circumstances. Passing was achieved through discipline, not renunciation (Foucault, 1977). For
many of the participants, their ability to pass as fluent was predicated on their skill at handling
situations and manipulating their own speech. The resistance of the participants affirms that they
are not simply repressed by forces beyond their control but challenge, contest, and generate
meaning of their own (Weiler, 1988).
Covert stuttering, then, is not inauthentic stuttering but a form of stuttering that is
produced through the use of specific technologies of communication. These technologies of
communication, summarized in Table 3, are constituted by the unique ethical relation of the
person who stutters with herself. The individual must decide that his fluency is something that
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can reasonably be cordoned off from the rest of their identity and be acted upon. That is, the
moments of stuttering found in their speech formed the ethical substance of people who pass as
fluent. The participants came to know their stuttering in this way through the modes of
subjection. Delegitimization was the mode of subjection most readily identified by the
participants. Through direct interactions with others and through implicit messages circulating in
society, participants had their stuttering devalued and positioned as inferior to fluency. The
participants’ experiences of delegitimization showed them that fluency was a necessity for good
communication and was preferred by listeners.
Once stuttering became an ethical substance by way of the mode of subjection, the
participants used many self-forming activities to pass as fluent. These self-forming activities
were the specific technologies of communication used to produce covert stuttering. Most of these
practices were active manipulations of the speaking situation, words used, sentence structure,
and sentence content. Participants also used careful planning to prepare for difficult speaking
situations and avoided situations, people, words, and activities at strategic times. These practices
of self were used to achieve the telos, which, in the case passing as fluent, was access to the
privileges of perceived able-bodiedness.
.
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Table 3.
Practices of Passing (n=the number of participant who identified each theme)
1 Ethical Substance: the part of oneself a person must submit to their control to pass
1.1 Act of stuttering (n=9): Participants decided what disfluencies were interpreted as disordered speech
and avoided displaying these. Although some participants would acknowledge they stuttered, they
would not display it.
1.2 Identification as a stutterer (n=3): Some participants would not identify as a person who stutters at
all. For them, it was not the act of stuttering alone that needed controlling but also their identities as
people who stutter.
2 Mode of Subjection: the way in which the act of stuttering and the identification as a stutterer came to be
problematic
2.1 Experience of Delegitimization (n=9): Participants were taught that the act of stuttering and
identification as a stutterer were ethical substances by their experiences of delegitimization.
2.1.1
Direct Delegitimization (n=9): occurs when another’s actions intentionally have the
effect of taking agency away from an individual, such as in bullying and
discrimination.
2.1.2
Indirect Delegitimization (n=9): occurs when another’s actions do not intend to but,
nonetheless have the effect of taking agency away from an individual, such as in
implicit social stigma and subtle listener reactions.
3 Self-Forming Activities: the actions participants took to pass
3.1 Prediction (n=9): Participants predicted the occurrence of stuttering.
3.1.1
Real-time adjustments (n=9): Participants altered what words they said based on
their history with the words, an intuition that they might stutter on them, or on an
internal feeling of stuttering.
3.1.2
Detailed planning (n=2): Participants would plan out, in advance, entire sentences of
words they knew they could say fluently.
3.2 Manipulation (n=9): Participants altered their speech to disguise stutters.
3.2.1
Word (n=9): Participants manipulated their words by changing them, creating made
up words, combining words in subtle ways, and adding sounds to words.
3.2.2
Sentence (n=9): Participants manipulated their sentences by using starter phrases,
inserting phrases mid-sentence, restarting sentences, rewording sentences, changing
the word order in sentences, and planning sentences in advance.
3.2.3
Content (n=9): Participants manipulated the content of their speech by expressing
less than what they would have liked, altering the topic of the discussions, describing
things in alternate ways, delaying when they said certain things, and ignoring social
norms (such as greetings and pleasantries).
3.2.4
Sound (n=9): Participants manipulated the sound of their voices to both facilitate
fluency and disguise stutters as typical disfluencies. Some of the fluency facilitating
techniques were to use a breathy voice, sing, use a stage voice or alternate persona,
and use a strained vocal quality.
3.3 Avoidance (n=9): Participants avoided specific situations, words, people, speaking opportunities, and
activities where it would be difficult to pass. Sometimes they just refused to speak.
4 Telos: the goal of passing as fluent
4.1 Able-bodied privilege (n=9): Participants wished to secure the taken-for-granted advantages that
accompany the perception of normality.

Clinical Considerations
Individuals choose to enroll in therapy when the meanings they make of their lived
experiences are restrictive and constraining (White & Epston, 1990). People do not make
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meaning in isolation but rather through the societal discourses that are available to them
(Foucault, 1980). People who pass as fluent are denied agency by dominant ways of
understanding stuttering, both overt and covert, as evidenced by their modes of subjection.
However, people who pass as fluent also demonstrate high levels of agency in their lives, as
confirmed by their self-forming activities. Therefore, there are significant aspects of the lived
experience of people who pass as fluent that contradict the narrative that people who covertly
stutter are helpless and fearful. By exploring these points of contradiction in therapy, people who
pass can reframe their experiences and produce alternative ways of relating to themselves
(Sawicki, 1991). They can analyze the technologies of self that have produced their identities and
the technologies of communication that have produced their stuttering patterns to change them.
The outcome of therapy can be the identification and generation of alternative technologies of
communication that allow people who stutter to give new, more beneficial, fulfilling, and openended meanings to their speech (White & Epston, 1990).
The results of this analysis and previous writing on working clinically with people who
pass as fluent (Cheasman & Everard, 2013; Levy, 1987) allow for some suggestions for people
who wish to use different technologies of communication. To pass as fluent one must identify the
act of stuttering as an ethical substance. Therefore, to produce oneself differently, a person who
stutters could identify avoidance of stuttering or effort and struggle as an ethical substance. Once
one of these alternative ethical substances was identified, self-forming activities would seek to
control or modify them. To control avoidance of stuttering the person may purposely say words
that she often stutters on, enter situations in which stuttering is likely, or voluntarily stutter.
Likewise, to mitigate effort and struggle he may abandon practices that make speech more
difficult, such as scanning ahead for words he might stutter on or using starter sounds and words
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to bypass a stutter. The telos of a person who identifies avoidance of stuttering as an ethical
substance might be comfort and acceptance of stuttering or even stuttering pride. The telos of a
person who identifies effort and struggle as an ethical substance might be spontaneity
(Constantino & Manning, 2015). By helping people who pass as fluent identify how they have
been constructed and how they have resisted these constructions, clinicians can show their clients
that they are “are much freer than they feel” (Foucault & Martin, 1988, pp. 10-11).
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Chapter 3: The Experience of Spontaneous Speech
Introduction
People who stutter often experience a marked reduction in quality of life, personal
agency, ability to communicate with others, decreased income, and discrimination in their
everyday life (Allard & Williams, 2008; Blood et al., 2003; Blumgart et al., 2010; Craig et al.,
2003; Klein & Hood, 2004a; MacKinnon et al., 2007; St. Louis, 2005; St. Louis et al., 2009).
Severity of stuttering is often determined by frequency of disfluency measures but these are
notoriously unreliable (Yaruss, 1997b), highly variable (Constantino et al., 2016), and have little
relationship with the impact of the disorder on people’s lives (Manning & Beck, 2013; Yaruss &
Quesal, 2006).
Despite these drawbacks, much research and clinical work in stuttering focuses primarily
on the goal of decreasing frequency of stuttering (Marcotte & Santus, 2015; Nippold, 2011). This
has two unfortunate consequences. First, the insistence that the problem with stuttering is the
occurrence of disfluency prevents people who stutter from finding value and meaning in their
disfluencies. Their unique way of speaking is routinely positioned as negative and inferior by
both helping professionals and by wider society in general (St. Pierre, 2012). Instead of asking
what they might gain from stuttering, such as increased connection and intimacy with others
(Constantino, 2016), people who stutter are taught to try to eliminate it. These societal messages
can lead to self-stigmatization (Boyle & Blood, 2015; Boyle, 2013, 2015). Second, and of
importance to the current investigation, therapy techniques that increase fluency often require
considerable self-monitoring and make speech difficult and unnatural sounding. Fluency is
gained at the expense of spontaneity. As a result, while objectively these techniques may reduce
disfluency, many people who stutter find these techniques unsatisfactory and either refuse to or
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cannot use them long term (Yaruss et al., 2002). There is likely a qualitative difference between
the subjective experience of a fluent person speaking and of a person who stutters using fluency
shaping techniques. The aim of this paper is to begin to quantify that difference.
Spontaneous Speech
When a fluent person speaks they can be said to be spontaneously fluent. They do not
need to think about the physical production of speech to be fluent. This does not mean they are
necessarily carefree; they may be thinking about the language they wish to use, the logic of their
arguments, and connecting with their speaking partner. However, they are not concerned with
how to overcome moments of disfluency or how to volitionally move their speech forward.
Ingham, Warner, Byrd, and Cotton (2006) describe this condition as normally fluent speech.
Normal fluent speech contains little disfluency, is produced at a typical speech rate, has a natural
sounding quality, and is produced with little effort (see Finn & Ingham, 1989; Starkweather,
1987).
People who stutter using fluency shaping techniques can be said to be effortfully fluent;
that is, their speech is fluent only through extensive use of non-normal self-control (Ingham,
1984; Perkins, 1985). Starkweather (1987) defines two ways in which speech can be effortful: 1)
it can require cognitive preparation, and 2) it can require muscular exertion. In order to use
fluency techniques, such as a reduced speaking rate, continuous phonation, light articulatory
contacts, and easy onsets, the speaker must concentrate on hitting their targets (Manning &
DiLollo, 2018). This requires the speaker to exert effortful attentional control (DeCaro &
Beilock, 2010; Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2010). They are attending to the physical production
of speech and their fluency is, therefore, not spontaneous. Quesal (2006, 2012) noted that often
when people who stutter appear to be speaking fluently it feels to the speaker as though they are
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“walking on ice.” That is, there is a feeling of uncertainty and hesitation. They are walking
carefully as they anticipate the possibility of falling at any moment. Similarly, for a person who
stutters, while their speech may be perceptually fluent, the speaker is experiencing effortful,
tenuous control. They are talking carefully with the constant possibility of losing control
threatening every moment.
Stuttering itself can be thought of as effortful disfluency when it is accompanied by the
experience of losing control (Cooper, 1968; Perkins, 1990) and an inability to volitionally move
forward in speech (Bloodstein & Shogan, 1972; Moore & Perkins, 1990). When this occurs,
speakers describe actively wrestling with their speech in order to regain control (Bobrick, 2011;
Carlisle, 1986; Jezer, 1997); effortful attentional control is needed to progress speech forward.
Not all stuttering coincides in a loss of control; stuttering modification is possible (Cooper, 1968,
1974; Manning, 2010; Van Riper, 1938, 1973, 1982). This stuttering requires little effort and
evokes minimum reaction from the speaker (Sheehan, 1970, 1972). The person stuttering is not
inhibited in their ability to move forward in their speech and there are no conscious attempts
made to control the stuttering. We will call it spontaneous disfluency.
These four distinct subjective experiences of speaking are summarized in Figure 1. The
diagram in the figure puts fluency on the x-axis and spontaneity on the y-axis. Increasing x-axis
values represent more fluency and decreasing x-axis values represent greater disfluency.
Likewise, increasing y-axis values represent greater spontaneity in speech while decreasing yvalues represent more effortful speech.
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Figure 1: Four Quadrant Model of Spontaneity and Fluency1
The difficulty of stuttering may have less to do with the occurrence of disfluency than
with the lack of spontaneity that accompanies effortful speech, regardless of the speaker’s degree
of fluency. Spontaneity can be inhibited by disfluencies themselves, the speaker’s reactions to
disfluencies, and effortful attempts to be fluent. Spontaneous speech is characterized by little
premeditation, effortless production, and is enjoyable. People who no longer stutter have
described this experience as relaxed, with an easy flow, without hinderance, with no awareness
of how they are speaking, without use of stuttering strategies, and, in a word, normal (Finn,
Howard, & Kubala, 2005). Stuttered speech is often effortful and lacking spontaneity; however,

1

This figure was first presented at the American Speech-Language-Hearing Association in 2015 by Constantino &
Manning

43

it can also be comparatively effortless and highly spontaneous. Those who stutter can also
produce fluent speech that is noticeably effortful – such as the speech used with some therapy
techniques – as well as fluent speech that is effortless and spontaneous. The fluent speech
achieved with some therapy techniques requires considerable self-monitoring and specific,
burdensome ways of modifying how one speaks. The upshot is that this speech, while fluent, is
not spontaneous. Speech that is constantly monitored and altered does not meet the requirements
of relaxed, unaware, strategy-free, or normal described by people who no longer stutter (Finn et
al., 2005).
In this paper, we ask three primary research questions: 1) What factors best predict how a
speaker perceives spontaneity, 2) What factors best predict how a speaker perceives fluency, 3)
How well do perceived spontaneity and perceived fluency predict life impact of the disorder. Our
hypothesis is that a measure of the degree to which speech is spontaneous—whether fluent or
stuttered—is a more accurate predictor the life impact of stuttering than frequency of stuttering.
We answer these questions by measuring participants’ frequency of disfluency and spontaneity
in speech as close to the experiences of speaking as possible using intensive longitudinal surveys
administered through mobile phone applications (Walls & Schafer, 2006). This technique is
known alternatively as ecological momentary assessment (Stone & Shiffman, 1994; Wu et al.,
2015) or the experience sampling method (Hektner et al., 2007). Using linear mixed models, we
build models for momentary perceived spontaneity, momentary perceived fluency, and life
impact of stuttering.
Measuring the Subjective Experience of Stuttering
The literature has noted the difficulty of measuring speech effort for decades (Locke,
1972; Malécot, 1955; Parnell & Amerman, 1977; Young, 1981). Objective measures of speech
44

effort have proved unsatisfactory (Young, 1981); ultimately, the most valid measures of speech
effort are based on speaker’s subjective perception (Ingham et al., 2006). However, lab-based
measures of subjective experience of stuttering can be problematic. Stuttering is highly variable
(Constantino et al., 2016; Yaruss, 1997a, 1997b). The task a person is performing, to whom she
is speaking, the location in which she finds themselves, and the situation she speaks in all have
an impact on her fluency (Ingham & Riley, 1998; Martin, Kuhl, & Haroldson, 1972; Silverman,
1971; Wexler, 1982). This variability has led to a call for more ecologically valid data collection
methods that occur outside of the clinic and the laboratory. (Costello & Ingham, 1984; Quesal,
1989; Tetnowski & Damico, 2001). By directly focusing on this variability underlying predictors
can be identified and modeled.
Ecological validity is the degree to which research findings can be generalized to the
settings and situations in which the phenomena of interest occurs in natural, nonexperimental
situations (Brewer & Crano, 2014). Many research methods that aim for ecological validity are
forced to rely on people’s memories for data collection. These include survey, interview, and
diary methods. Unfortunately, our minds are not high-fidelity experience recorders. When we
submit information to memory we alter it to confirm our biases, we deny and repress, and edit
according to social desirability; we actively organize our experiences in real-time (Bolger, Davis,
& Rafaeli, 2003; Hektner et al., 2007; Kunnen & Bosma, 1996). Our memories deteriorate and
when we recall information stored in them we reconstruct this information considering new
events and biases (Csikszentmihalyi & Beattie, 1979; Kegan, 1994; LeDoux, 2003; Yarmey,
1979). Our memories also tend to regress to an “average” experience, we generalize our
experiences and gloss over unique specifics (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). Researchers can mitigate
these effects of memory by having participants report on experiences as close to their occurrence
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as possible (Zuzanek, 1999). The experience sampling method is designed to address these
limitations.
The experience sampling method is a technique for investigating the real-time and
subjective nature of phenomena in natural, nonlaboratory, settings (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi,
1983). Collecting momentary samples of data in daily situations is called ecological momentary
assessment (Stone & Shiffman, 1994). The experience sampling method is a form of ecological
momentary assessment that uses surveys to probe subjective experience as it happens. To collect
data, participants are repeatedly and systematically sampled with short surveys during real-life
activities. Participants report on the moment they were sampled, this allows the surveys to occur
as close to the experience of the phenomena as possible. This decreases the potential for memory
bias that often occurs with retrospective reporting (Bolger et al., 2003). Since participants are
sampled in their everyday lives, contextual data, such as where the participants were and what
they were doing when the phenomena occurred, can be collected as well. The experience
sampling method simultaneously studies persons and situations (Hormuth, 1986; Larson &
Delespaul, 1992).

Methods
Participants
This study was approved by the university’s Institutional Review Board. Forty-four
participants who self-identified as people who stutter were recruited from across the country (see
Table 4 for demographic information). Twenty participants were female, and ages ranged from
21 to 71, with a mean age of 36 years old. Participants were recruited through online mailers,
posted flyers, word of mouth, and recruiting through self-help and support groups. All
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participants were native English speakers, self-disclosed that they had no known psychological,
emotional, neurological, or learning disabilities, and had continuous access to smart phones.
Participants with other disabilities were excluded from the study. Participants were paid from the
Institute for Intelligent System Student Organization Dissertation Grant Award. They received
$2.50 for completing all of the surveys from a given day and another $2.50 for completing all of
the surveys in the week. Participants had the potential of earning $20 in total.
Table 4.
Participant Demographics
ID

Age

Gender

OASES
Score

OASES Impact
Rating

1

54

Male

2.59

Moderate

7.6

*

*

2

41

Male

3.74

Moderate/Severe

5.78

36

3

46

Female

2.42

Moderate

7.1

9

Severe
Within Typical
Range

4

**

Female

**

**

**

31

Moderate

6

25

Female

3.37

Moderate/Severe

2.26

28

Moderate

7

30

Male

1.26

mild

9.12

26

Moderate

8

71

Male

1.66

Mild/Moderate

9.96

25

Moderate

9

26

Female

4.14

Severe

4.48

32

10

59

Female

1.55

Mild/Moderate

9.3

9

Severe
Within Typical
Range

11

23

Female

2.68

Moderate

6.44

28

Moderate

12

35

Male

2.03

Mild/Moderate

9.7

22

Mild

13

32

Male

3.07

Moderate/Severe

6.12

14

Very Mild

14

35

Male

2.49

Moderate

6.98

41

Very Severe

15

36

Male

1.78

Mild/Moderate

9.56

24

Mild

16

23

Female

2.97

Moderate

6.26

19

Mild

17

39

Female

2.85

Moderate

5.48

11

Very Mild

SESAS

SSI
Score

SSI Severity
Rating

18 42
Female
2.27
Moderate
4.56
28
Moderate
Note: * Sound file was corrupted and data were lost, ** Participant did not return form, OASES is the Overall
Assessment of the Speaker's Experience of Stuttering (Yaruss & Quesal, 2010), SESAS is the Self-Efficacy
Scale for Adults who Stutter (Ornstein & Manning, 1985), SSI is the Stuttering Severity Instrument 4-th
Edition (Riley, 2009)
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Table 4. (Continued)
Participant Demographics
ID

Age

Gender

OASES
Score

OASES Impact
Rating

SESAS

SSI
Score

SSI Severity
Rating

19

32

Female

2.05

Mild/Moderate

8.02

16

Very Mild

20

27

Female

2.01

Mild/Moderate

8.28

13

Very Mild

21

**

Male

**

**

**

21

22

21

Male

2.4

Moderate

7.74

9

Mild
Within Typical
Range

23

28

Male

3.11

Moderate/Severe

8.12

41

Very Severe

24

24

Female

2.39

Moderate

7.6

27

Moderate

26

25

Male

2.33

Moderate

8.34

19

Mild

27

33

Male

3.04

Moderate/Severe

5.22

32

Severe

28

47

Male

3.08

Moderate/Severe

6.24

15

Very Mild

29

35

Male

1.98

Mild/Moderate

8.48

27

Moderate

30

30

Male

2.1

Mild/Moderate

9.94

22

Mild

32

37

Male

3

Moderate/Severe

6.12

17

Very Mild

Male

2.21

Mild/Moderate

8.32

23

Mild

**

17

Very Mild

33
34

56

Female

**

**

35

37

Male

2.22

Mild/Moderate

7

26

Moderate

Male

**

**

**

24

Mild

36
37

60

Female

2.54

Moderate

4.98

25

Moderate

38

28

Male

2.95

Moderate

4.12

28

39

44

Female

3.01

Moderate/Severe

5.26

6

Moderate
Within Typical
Range

40

27

Male

3.96

Severe

5.16

41

Very Severe

41

37

Female

2.55

Moderate

8.04

25

Moderate

42

25

Male

2

Mild/Moderate

7.78

31

Moderate

43

26

Female

1.79

Mild/Moderate

7.22

31

Moderate

44

41

Female

2.93

Moderate

7.18

29

Moderate

45

46

Female

1.91

Mild/Moderate

9.6

19

Mild

46

32

Male

2.75

Moderate

7.48

17

Very Mild

47 30
Female
2.37
Moderate
8.12
29
Moderate
Note: * Sound file was corrupted and data were lost, ** Participant did not return form, OASES is the
Overall Assessment of the Speaker's Experience of Stuttering (Yaruss & Quesal, 2010), SESAS is the SelfEfficacy Scale for Adults who Stutter (Ornstein & Manning, 1985), SSI is the Stuttering Severity Instrument
4-th Edition (Riley, 2009)

Procedures
Participants in this study were sampled repeatedly, five times a day over the course of a
week. To account for the nature of this design the variances for each measured effect must be
appropriately modeled (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). For example, it is assumed that there will be
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less variability between samples from the same participant than samples from different
participants. This results in two levels, a person level and a moment level, to account for between
subject and within subject effects, respectively. The personal level includes all variables that
describe each participant uniquely, such as their age, gender, and stuttering characteristics. The
moment level includes all variables that describe the experience of each moment uniquely, such
as the context the participants were in, how spontaneous they felt, and how fluent they felt.
Figure 2 gives a summary of the two levels, they will be explained in more detail below.

Person Level

Moment Level

Age

Who: Speaking Partners

Gender

What: Speaking Situation

%SS

Where: Speaking Location

SSI-4

When: Day and Time

OASES

Perception of Spontaneity

SESAS

Perception of Fluency
Figure 2. Two Level Design

There were two stages of participation in this study. Participants were first sent the
consent form and study materials by mail. The consent form was explained to them by email.
Then there was an online video interview with the first author. The consent form was again
explained and any questions by the participants were answered. At the end of this video
interview the participants were instructed how to download an application called the Personal
Analytics Companion (PACO; https://pacoapp.com/). PACO administered the surveys for the
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second stage of the study. At the end of the video interview, the participants were taught how to
use PACO and walked through one sample survey with the first author. Immediately after the
interview, the experience sampling stage of the study began. Person level data were collected by
mail and during the video interview. Moment level data were collected through the PACO
application.
Person Level Data Collection
Person level data were collected through self-survey instruments sent through mail and
online video interviews. Each participant was mailed the Overall Assessment of the Speaker’s
Experience of Stuttering (OASES; Yaruss & Quesal, 2010) and the Self-Efficacy Scale for
Adults who Stutter (SESAS; Ornstein & Manning, 1985). The OASES is a self-survey
instrument that assesses the adverse impact of stuttering on the speaker. The SESAS is a scale
which estimates individuals who stutter’s self-efficacy for entering and maintaining fluency in a
variety of speaking situations. Self-efficacy measures how confident individuals are that they can
successfully perform a given action (Bandura, 1977; Bandura, Adams, & Beyer, 1977).
During the online video interview, a speech sample consisting of a conversation and a
reading was collected. Video interviews were around an hour long and the speech samples
followed the SSI protocol. The sample was audio-recorded to permit scoring by the first author
for percentage of syllables stuttered (%SS) and the mean duration of the three longest stuttering
events (Bakker & Riley, 2009). The first author rescored each sound file and a master’s student
with training in counting disfluencies scored 18 participants to determine reliability of coding.
Intra-rater agreement between the first author and himself was r=.998 (p<.001) and inter-rater
agreement between the two scorers was r=.907 (p<.01), indicating good reliability.
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The data from the audio recordings were used to calculate scores for the Stuttering
Severity Instrument – 4th Edition (SSI-4; Riley, 2009). The SSI measures severity of stuttering
by aggregating measures of stuttering frequency, the mean duration of the speaker’s three longest
stuttering moments, and the presence and severity of “physical concomitants” displayed by the
speaker. These three scores are combined to yield a measure of severity. In this study the SSI
score is used as a listener observed measure of fluency.
Moment Level Data Collection
The experience sampling method was used to collect moment level data. The surveys
were administered through the participants’ cell phones through the PACO application. PACO
works for both Apple iOS and Android phones. Participants were sampled five times a day for
one week. The signals only appeared between a preset time window for each day. The default
time window was between 8:00 AM and 10:00 PM; however, participants could adjust this time
window to suit their waking hours. Signals were delivered randomly with a minimum of 20
minutes between each signal.
When participants received a notice from PACO to fill out a survey they would report on
their most recent speaking experience (see Appendix for full survey). The first question also
asked whether they had a conversation since their last survey, if not they had nothing to report on
and the survey was over. If they had a conversation they would report on the context of the
conversation and their spontaneity and fluency during the conversation. Surveys took an average
of two minutes to complete. This mean completion time included surveys that were ended after
the first question; therefore, the average completion time for surveys that were completed was
longer than two minutes.
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Survey
Speaking Context: Who, What, Where, and When
The context variables are listed in Table 5. The PACO application automatically recorded
the date and time of day the participants responded to a survey. Participants were asked to
identify with whom they were speaking, whether the people they were speaking to were the same
or a different gender from their own, and the social status of the person to whom they were
speaking. They were also asked how much the people they were speaking to knew about their
stuttering and if the person they were speaking to stuttered as well. The speakers indicated where
they were and the situation in which they spoke, for example if it was a phone call at home or a
presentation at work.
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Table 5.
Context Questions
I.
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

II.
6.
7.
8.

III.
9.

Who: Speaking Partners
With whom did you speak (you may choose more than one)?
a. Stranger
b. Acquaintance
c. Friend
d. Family
e. Coworker
f. Romantic Partner
What was the gender of your speaking partner(s) (you may choose more than one)?
a. Same as my own
b. Different from my own
c. Unknown
What was the status of your audience (you may choose more than one)?
a. Subordinate
b. Peer
c. Superordinate
How much did your speaking partner know about your stuttering?
a. They do not know I stutter
b. They have heard me stutter but may not have known it was stuttering
c. They have heard me stutter and probably recognized it as stuttering
d. I have acknowledged my stuttering to them
e. They have asked me questions about my stuttering
f. We often discuss stuttering
Did your speaking partner stutter as well?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Unsure
What: Speaking Situation
Indicate the CHALLENGE of the main activity you were doing
1: Low … 9: High
Indicate your SKILLS at the main activity you were doing
1: Low … 9: High
What was the situation in which you spoke (you may choose more than one)?
a. One-on-one
b. Presentation
c. Phone call
d. Group
e. Other
Where: Speaking Location
During the Conversation, where were you?
a. Home
b. Work
c. School
d. In transit/Commuting
e. Other  manually type in location

They also indicated how challenging the activity they were doing was and their skill level
at it. The challenge and skills questions referred not to the challenge and skill of speaking but of
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the action taking place. For example, if the participant was speaking while reading the
newspaper, the challenge may be low and their skill high; while speaking while landing a plane
after the pilot has passed out may be a high challenge, low skill situation. Alternatively, for a
professional racer, speaking while driving down the road may be a low challenge, high skill
situation but speaking while driving in a race may be a high challenge, high skill situation.
Challenge and skill were rated on a Likert scale ranging from one to nine, with one representing
low challenge or skill and nine representing high challenge or skill (Likert, 1932). Figure 3
shows a screen shot of what the context questions looked like on the PACO application.

Figure 3. Context Questions Screen Shot
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Speaking Experience: Spontaneity and Fluency
The questions used to measure spontaneity and fluency are shown in Table 6. These
questions were developed in collaboration with adults who stutter from the university’s adult
treatment group and a local support group. The first author attended both the treatment group and
support group and asked members to describe what their speech was like when it was difficult
and effortful, and when it was easy and spontaneous, regardless of stuttering or fluency. Their
responses were noted and turned into questions used to probe the subjective experience of
stuttering from moment to moment.
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Table 6.
Subjective Experience Questions
I.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
II.
1.
2.
3.

Spontaneity
I paid close attention to how I physically spoke
1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
I was embarrassed by my speech
1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
During the conversation, I was primarily listening to
1: My speaking partner … 9: How I spoke
I enjoyed the conversation
1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
I felt confident
1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
I was able to clearly convey my thoughts and feelings
1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
I am glad I had the conversation
1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
Talking was
1: Easy … 9: Effortful
The amount of physical tension I felt while speaking was
1: Low … 9: High
I felt in charge of my speech
1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
Speaking was like writing in my best handwriting, it required careful concentration
1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
I struggled to get my words out
1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
How difficult was it to achieve this fluency?
1: Easy … 9: Difficult
Speaking was like breathing, I never thought of it
1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
How much did the possibility of disfluency affect what you said?
1: A lot … 9: Not at all
I had difficulty finding the right words to express myself
1: Never … 9: Often
I felt unable to control my speech
1: Never … 9: Very often
I needed to carefully plan out how to say what I wanted to say
1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
Fluency
How often did you restart a word, phrase, or sentence?
1: Never … 9: Very often
How fluent was your speech?
1: Low … 9: High
My speech contained hesitations, pauses, and interjections
1: Never … 9: Very often

When describing spontaneous speech, regardless of stuttering, the members of the group
felt they did not have to control anything, they could speak without thinking about it. They said
in these situations they were not concerned about stuttering and they could focus on the
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conversational interaction rather than the mechanics of speaking. The conversations flowed
easily and were enjoyable. The questions used to measure spontaneity reflect these sentiments.
The questions used to measure fluency ask about fluency in general, as well as specific
disfluency types. Questions purposely do not mention stutter or spontaneity specifically.
All subjective experience questions were rated on nine item Likert scales. Their choices
are shown in Table 3. The participants’ momentary perception of spontaneity and momentary
perception of fluency were calculated from the mean scores for all spontaneity questions and all
fluency questions, respectively. To ensure that participants would not adapt to the questions and
click through without reading them, the questions were randomized, and some items
incorporated reversed polarity. That is, for some questions high ratings reflected greater
spontaneity or fluency and for other questions low ratings reflected greater spontaneity or
fluency. The reversed-polarity questions were rectified before momentary perception of
spontaneity and momentary perception of fluency were calculated. Figure 4 shows a screenshot
of what the subjective experience questions looked like on the PACO application.
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Figure 4. Subjective Experience Questions Screen Shot
Analyses
Using linear mixed models regression analysis, we modeled momentary perception of
spontaneity, momentary perception of fluency, and life impact of stuttering. Both the models for
momentary perception of spontaneity and momentary perception of fluency used person level
and moment level effects. The model for life impact of stuttering used only person level effects.
To accommodate the difference in between-participant variance and within-participant variance,
the models for momentary perception of spontaneity and momentary perception of fluency also
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included a random effect for each participant. Random effects allow each individual subject to
deviate from the overall fixed effects and helps account for the additional variance introduced by
the repeated measures sampling method. All models were built using SAS software.
All models begin with a loaded model which includes all variables of interest. Effects are
removed from the loaded model systematically to form reduced models. The goodness of fit of
the two statistical models is how well the models explain the data. The goodness of fit of both
models are compared using a likelihood ratio test. The null hypothesis of the likelihood ratio test
is that the reduced model is sufficient to explain the data, the alternative hypothesis is that the
additional effects in the more complex model are needed to explain the data. Models are reduced
by first removing random effects, then level 2 effects (person level), and then level 1effects
(moment level). Next, nonsignifigant person level effects are removed followed by non
signifigant moment level effects. The analyses below will walk through the hypothesis testing
used to reduce the models from the loaded model to the best fit model.

Results
Descriptive Statistics
The 44 participants contributed 941 surveys. Participants completed 62.18% of surveys
administered. Momentary perception of spontaneity and momentary perception of fluency were
highly correlated (r=.713, p<.0001 2-tailed, n=941), see Figure 5. To compare momentary
perception of spontaneity and momentary perception of fluency to person level variables, each
participant’s mean spontaneity and mean fluency were used. Mean perception of spontaneity and
mean perception of spontaneity were significantly correlated (r = .640, p<.0001 2-tailed). Life
impact of stuttering (OASES) was not significantly correlated with observed fluency (SSI; r =
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.270 2-tailed, p=.096, n=39). Mean momentary perception of spontaneity was not significantly
correlated to observed fluency (SSI score; r=-.136, p=.386 2-tailed, n=43) but was significantly
correlated with life impact of stuttering (OASES score; r=-.578, p<.0001 2-tailed, n=40). Mean
momentary perception of fluency was significantly correlated to both observed fluency (SSI
score; r=-.340, p=.026 2-tailed, n=43) and life impact of stuttering (OASES score; r=-.326,
p=.038 2-tailed, n=40). The correlation of the life impact of stuttering with mean momentary
perceived spontaneity was significantly larger than the correlation of life impact of stuttering
with mean momentary perceived fluency (z=.2.102, p<.018 1-tailed; Lee & Preacher, 2013).
Table 7 shows all person level correlations.

Momentary Perception of Spontaneity vs Momentary Perception of Fluency
9
8

r = .713, p < .0001 (2-tailed), n = 941

Fluency Score

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Spontaneity Score

Figure 5. Relationship between momentary perception of spontaneity and momentary perception
of fluency
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Table 7.
Person Level Correlations
Momentary
perception of
Spontaneity
--

Momentary
perception of
Fluency

OASES

SSI

SESAS

Momentary
perception of
Spontaneity
Momentary
.640**
-perception of
Fluency
OASES
-.578**
-.329*
-SSI
-.136
-.34*
.27
-SESAS
.545**
.252
-.169
-.744**
-Note: ** correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed), * correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed),
OASES is the Overall Assessment of the Speaker's Experience of Stuttering (Yaruss & Quesal, 2010), SESAS is
the Self-Efficacy Scale for Adults who Stutter (Ornstein & Manning, 1985), SSI is the Stuttering Severity
Instrument 4-th Edition (Riley, 2009)

Momentary Perception of Spontaneity and Fluency
The loaded models for momentary perception of spontaneity and momentary perception
of fluency included four person level variables: age, gender, observed fluency (as measured by
the SSI), and self-efficacy (as measured by the SESAS). They also contained moment level
variables measuring location of conversation, when the conversation took place, what context the
situation took place in, and who the individual was speaking to. They contained a random
participant effect as well. Equation 1, in Appendix B, gives the full loaded model for both.
Hypothesis Testing: Spontaneity
The process of building the model for momentary perception of spontaneity is
summarized in Table 18 of Appendix D and explained in detail below.
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1. Loaded model vs fixed effects only
The loaded model for momentary perception of spontaneity includes a random intercept
for each participant and all person level and moment level fixed effects. The first test was
whether the random subject effect could be removed from the model. The null hypothesis was
2
that the variance for the random effect (𝜎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡
) was 0, the alternative hypothesis was that

the variance term for the random effect was greater than zero. A likelihood ratio test revealed
that the loaded model was significantly more likely than the model sans random effects
(p=.0000000001); therefore, we rejected the null and kept the random subject effect.
2. Loaded model vs model with removed person level effects
Next, we removed the highest level fixed effects, the person level fixed effects. The null
hypothesis was that all person level fixed effect coefficients were equal to zero (𝛽36 = 𝛽37 =
𝛽38 = 𝛽39 = 0), the alternative hypothesis was that the coefficients for one of the person level
fixed effects did not equal 0. A likelihood ratio test revealed that the loaded model was
significantly more likely than the model sans person level fixed effects (p=.0000000001);
therefore, we rejected the null and kept the person level fixed effects.
3. Loaded model vs model with removed moment level effects
The moment level fixed effects were removed next. The null hypothesis was that all
moment level fixed effect coefficients were equal to zero (𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 𝛽6 =
𝛽7 = 𝛽8 = 𝛽9 = 𝛽10 = 𝛽11 = 𝛽12 = 𝛽13 = 𝛽14 = 𝛽15 = 𝛽16 = 𝛽17 = 𝛽18 = 𝛽19 = 𝛽20 =
𝛽21 = 𝛽22 = 𝛽23 = 𝛽24 = 𝛽25 = 𝛽26 = 𝛽27 = 𝛽28 = 𝛽29 = 𝛽30 = 𝛽31 = 𝛽32 = 𝛽33 = 𝛽34 =
𝛽35=0) the alternative hypothesis was that the coefficients for one of the person level fixed
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effects did not equal zero. A likelihood ratio test revealed that the loaded model was significantly
more likely than the model sans moment level fixed effects (p=.0000000001); therefore, we
rejected the null and kept the moment level fixed effects.
4. Loaded model vs model with nonsignificant person level variables removed
Table 8 shows the type 3 tests of fixed effects for the person level fixed effects in the
loaded model for momentary perception of spontaneity. Only SESAS was a significant predictor
of momentary perception of spontaneity at the p<.05 level. We removed all the nonsignificant
person level fixed effects. The null hypothesis was that the coefficients for age, gender, and SSI
were equal to zero (𝛽36 = 𝛽37 = 𝛽39 = 0), the alternative hypothesis was that the coefficients
for one of these did not equal zero. A likelihood ratio test revealed that the loaded model was
significantly more likely than the model sans nonsignificant person level fixed effects
(p=.0000000001); therefore, we rejected the null and kept all the person level fixed effects.

Table 8.
Loaded Model for Momentary Perception of Spontaneity
Type 3 Tests of Person Level Fixed Effects
Effect

F value

P value

Age

1.44

0.2382

Gender

0

0.9946

SESAS

12.18

0.0014

SSI

0.5

0.4838

Note: SESAS is the Self-Efficacy Scale for Adults who Stutter (Ornstein & Manning,
1985), SSI is the Stuttering Severity Instrument 4-th Edition (Riley, 2009)

5. Loaded model vs model with nonsignificant moment level variables removed
Table 9 shows the Type 3 tests of fixed effects for the moment level fixed effects in the
loaded model for momentary perception of fluency. At the p<.05 level, day of the week,
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challenge, family, superordinate, stuttering knowledge, presentation, and phone call were all
significant predictors of momentary perception of spontaneity. We removed all the
nonsignificant moment level fixed effects. The null hypothesis was that the coefficients for
minutes in day, place, stranger, acquaintance, friend, coworker, romantic partner, same gender,
different gender, subordinate, peer, stutter too, one-on-one, and group conversation all equal zero
(𝛽7 = 𝛽8 = 𝛽9 = 𝛽10 = 𝛽11 = 𝛽13 = 𝛽14 = 𝛽15 = 𝛽16 = 𝛽18 = 𝛽19 = 𝛽20 = 𝛽21 = 𝛽22 =
𝛽23 = 𝛽30 = 𝛽31 = 𝛽32 = 𝛽35=0), the alternative hypothesis was that the coefficients for one of
these did not equal zero. A likelihood ratio test revealed that the loaded model was not
significantly more likely than the model sans nonsignificant moment level fixed effects (p=0.19);
therefore, we could not reject the null hypothesis. We removed all nonsignificant moment level
fixed effects.
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Table 9.
Loaded Model for Momentary Perception of Spontaneity
Type 3 Tests of Moment Level Fixed Effects
Effect

F value

P value

Day of Week

2.82

0.0101

Minutes in day

1.28

0.2588

Place

1.59

0.1755

Challenge

59.88

<.0001

Skill

0.79

0.3739

Stranger

1.88

0.1704

Acquaintance

1.61

0.2045

Friend

1.66

0.1978

Family

8

0.0048

Coworker

1.05

0.3054

Romantic Partner

1.75

0.1858

Same Gender

0.08

0.7711

Different Gender

0.29

0.5899

Subordinate

0.32

0.5712

Peer

1.16

0.2824

Superordinate

8.25

0.0042

Stuttering Knowledge

5.57

<.0001

Stutter Too

1.06

0.3457

One-on-one

0.27

0.6043

Presentation

4.88

0.0274

Phone Call

8.47

0.0037

Group Conversation

1.45

0.2283

6. Reduced model vs reduced model with nonsignificant person level variables removed
We try again to remove the nonsignificant person level fixed effects from the reduced
model. Table 10 shows the type 3 tests of fixed effects for the person level fixed effects in the
reduced model for momentary perception of spontaneity. Only SESAS was a significant
predictor of momentary perception of spontaneity at the p<.05 level. We removed all the
nonsignificant person level fixed effects. The null hypothesis was that the coefficients for age,
gender, and SSI were equal to zero (𝛽36 = 𝛽37 = 𝛽39 = 0), the alternative hypothesis was that
the coefficients for one of these did not equal zero. A likelihood ratio test revealed that the
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reduced model with all the person level fixed effects was significantly more likely than the
model sans nonsignificant person level fixed effects (p=.0000000001); therefore, we rejected the
null and kept all the person level fixed effects.
Table 10.
Reduced Model for Momentary Perception of Spontaneity
Type 3 Tests of Person Level Fixed Effects
Effect

F value

P value

Age

1.05

0.3118

Gender

0.06

0.8121

SESAS

12.89

0.0011

SSI

1.01

0.3223

Note: SESAS is the Self-Efficacy Scale for Adults who Stutter (Ornstein & Manning,
1985), SSI is the Stuttering Severity Instrument 4-th Edition (Riley, 2009)

Final Model
The final model for momentary perception of spontaneity includes age, gender, SESAS,
and SSI as person level fixed effects, with only SESAS a significant predictor of spontaneity,
and the random participant effect. It also includes day of the week, challenge, family,
superordinate, stuttering knowledge, presentation, and phone call as moment level fixed effects,
all of these were significant predictors of spontaneity. Day of the week and stuttering knowledge
were modeled at categorical variables. Tuesday was used as the reference level for day of the
week because, on average, it was the most spontaneous day. Both Monday and Saturday were
significantly less spontaneous than Tuesday. Assuming the participants’ speaking partner did not
know they stuttered was used as the reference level for stuttering knowledge. Having discussed
stuttering with their speaking partner significantly increased participant spontaneity.
The parameter estimate for all these fixed effects are shown in Table 11. For every one
unit change in a fixed effect, and all other fixed effects held equal, momentary perception of
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spontaneity can be expected to change by that effect’s parameter estimate. For example, all other
effects held equal, momentary perception of spontaneity is expected to decrease by .6609 during
a presentation and to increase by .767 when speaking to someone with whom stuttering has
already been discussed.
Table 11.
Momentary Perception of Spontaneity Final Parameter Estimates
Fixed Effect
Intercept
Age
Gender
SESAS
SSI
Day of Week

Level of Categorical Variable

Friday
Monday
Saturday
Sunday
Thursday
Wednesday
Tuesday
Challenge
Family
Superordinate
Stuttering Knowledge

Estimate
5.0998
0.01264
0.06568
0.2675
-0.01558
-0.2513
-0.5365
-0.3231
-0.2091
-0.1859
-0.03049
0
-0.1793
0.2929
-0.2997

Pr > F

Pr > |t|
<.0001

0.3118
0.8121
0.0011
0.3223
.0073
0.0772
0.0004
0.0207
0.1621
0.1812
0.8270
.
<.0001
0.0127
0.0067
.0001

Discussed
They have asked about stuttering
They have heard me stuttering and know
They have heard me stutter and may not know
I have told them I stutter
They do not know I stutter

0.7670
<.0001
0.3194
0.0657
0.001831
0.9901
-0.1044
0.4875
0.01491
0.9137
0
.
Presentation
-0.6609
0.0132
Phone Call
-0.3856
0.0004
Note: SESAS is the Self-Efficacy Scale for Adults who Stutter (Ornstein & Manning, 1985), SSI is the
Stuttering Severity Instrument 4-th Edition (Riley, 2009)

Hypothesis Testing: Fluency
The process of building the model for momentary perception of fluency is summarized in
Table 19 of Appendix D and explained in detail below.
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1. Loaded model vs fixed effects only
The loaded model for momentary perception of fluency includes a random intercept for
each participant and all person level and moment level fixed effects. The first test was whether
the random subject effect could be removed from the model. The null hypothesis was that the
2
variance for the random effect (𝜎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡
) was zero, the alternative hypothesis was that the

variance term for the random effect was greater than zero. A likelihood ratio test revealed that
the loaded model was significantly more likely than the model sans random effects
(p=.0000000001); therefore, we rejected the null and kept the random subject effect.
2. Loaded model vs model with removed person level effects
Next, we removed the highest level fixed effects, the person level fixed effects. The null
hypothesis was that all person level fixed effect coefficients were equal to zero (𝛽36 = 𝛽37 =
𝛽38 = 𝛽39 = 0), the alternative hypothesis was that the coefficients for one of the person level
fixed effects did not equal zero. A likelihood ratio test revealed that the loaded model was
significantly more likely than the model sans person level fixed effects (p=.0000000001);
therefore, we rejected the null and kept the person level fixed effects.
3. Loaded model vs model with removed moment level effects
The moment level fixed effects were removed next. The null hypothesis was that all
moment level fixed effect coefficients were equal to zero (𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 𝛽6 =
𝛽7 = 𝛽8 = 𝛽9 = 𝛽10 = 𝛽11 = 𝛽12 = 𝛽13 = 𝛽14 = 𝛽15 = 𝛽16 = 𝛽17 = 𝛽18 = 𝛽19 = 𝛽20 =
𝛽21 = 𝛽22 = 𝛽23 = 𝛽24 = 𝛽25 = 𝛽26 = 𝛽27 = 𝛽28 = 𝛽29 = 𝛽30 = 𝛽31 = 𝛽32 = 𝛽33 = 𝛽34 =
𝛽35=0) the alternative hypothesis was that the coefficients for one of the person level fixed
68

effects did not equal zero. A likelihood ratio test revealed that the loaded model was significantly
more likely than the model sans moment level fixed effects (p=.0000000001); therefore, we
rejected the null and kept the moment level fixed effects.
4. Loaded model vs model with nonsignificant person level variables removed
Table 12 shows the type 3 tests of fixed effects for the person level fixed effects in the
loaded model for momentary perception of fluency. Only SSI was a significant predictor of
momentary perception of fluency at the p<.05 level. We removed all the nonsignificant person
level fixed effects. The null hypothesis was that the coefficients for age, gender, and SESAS
were equal to zero (𝛽36 = 𝛽37 = 𝛽38 = 0), the alternative hypothesis was that the coefficients
for one of these did not equal zero. A likelihood ratio test revealed that the loaded model was
significantly more likely than the model sans nonsignificant person level fixed effects
(p=.0000000001); therefore, we rejected the null and kept all the person level fixed effects.
Table 12.
Loaded Model for Momentary Perception of Fluency
Type 3 Tests of Person Level Fixed Effects
Effect

F value

P value

Age

0.02

0.8828

Gender

0

0.9838

SESAS

1.18

0.1696

SSI

4.21

0.0476

Note: SESAS is the Self-Efficacy Scale for Adults who Stutter (Ornstein & Manning, 1985),
SSI is the Stuttering Severity Instrument 4-th Edition (Riley, 2009)

5. Loaded model vs model with nonsignificant moment level variables removed
Table 13 shows the Type 3 tests of fixed effects for the moment level fixed effects in the
loaded model for momentary perception of fluency. At the p<.05 level, challenge, superordinate,
stuttering knowledge, and phone call were all significant predictors of momentary perception of
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fluency. We removed all the nonsignificant moment level fixed effects. The null hypothesis was
that the coefficients for minutes in day, place, stranger, acquaintance, friend, coworker, romantic
partner, same gender, different gender, subordinate, peer, stutter too, one-on-one, presentation,
and group conversation all equal zero (𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 𝛽6 = 𝛽7 = 𝛽8 = 𝛽9 = 𝛽10 =
𝛽11 = 𝛽13 = 𝛽14 = 𝛽15 = 𝛽16 = 𝛽17 = 𝛽18 = 𝛽19 = 𝛽20 = 𝛽21 = 𝛽22 = 𝛽23 = 𝛽30 = 𝛽31 =
𝛽32 = 𝛽33 = 𝛽35 =0), the alternative hypothesis was that the coefficients for one of these did not
equal zero. A likelihood ratio test revealed that the loaded model was not significantly more
likely than the model sans nonsignificant moment level fixed effects (p=0.09); therefore, we
could not reject the null hypothesis. We removed all nonsignificant moment level fixed effects.
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Table 13.
Loaded Model for Momentary Perception of Fluency
Type 3 Tests of Moment Level Fixed Effects
Effect
Day of Week

F value
1.33

P value
0.2409

Minutes in day

0.34

0.5619

Place

0.07

0.9920

Challenge

38.34

<.0001

Skill

1.56

0.2126

Stranger

1.39

0.2392

Acquaintance

0.05

0.8175

Friend

0.00

0.9534

Family

1.75

0.1868

Coworker

2.20

0.1386

Romantic Partner

0.85

0.3580

Same Gender

0.02

0.8765

Different Gender

1.08

0.2990

Subordinate

0.72

0.3960

Peer

1.92

0.1658

Superordinate

4.44

0.0354

Stuttering Knowledge

4.69

0.0003

Stutter Too

1.33

0.2660

One-on-one

0.14

0.7071

Presentation

3.23

0.0727

Phone Call

7.98

0.0048

Group Conversation

0.09

0.7687

6. Reduced model vs reduced model with nonsignificant person level variables removed
We try again to remove the nonsignificant person level fixed effects from the reduced
model. Table 14 shows the type 3 tests of fixed effects for the person level fixed effects in the
reduced model for momentary perception of fluency. Only SSI was a significant predictor of
momentary perception of fluency at the p<.05 level. We removed all the nonsignificant person
level fixed effects. The null hypothesis was that the coefficients for age, gender, and SESAS
were equal to zero (𝛽36 = 𝛽37 = 𝛽38 = 0), the alternative hypothesis was that the coefficients
for one of these did not equal zero. A likelihood ratio test revealed that the reduced model with
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all the person level fixed effects was significantly more likely than the model sans nonsignificant
person level fixed effects (p=.0000000001); therefore, we rejected the null and kept all the
person level fixed effects.
Table 14.
Reduced Model for Momentary Perception of Fluency
Type 3 Tests of Person Level Fixed Effects
Effect

F value

P value

Age

0.18

0.6769

Gender

0.06

0.8092

SESAS

1.73

0.1978

SSI

4.23

0.0474

Note: SESAS is the Self-Efficacy Scale for Adults who Stutter (Ornstein & Manning, 1985),
SSI is the Stuttering Severity Instrument 4-th Edition (Riley, 2009)

7. Reduced model vs reduced model with nonsignificant moment level variables removed
Table 15 shows the Type 3 tests of fixed effects for the moment level fixed effects in the
reduced model for momentary perception of fluency. At the p<.05 level, challenge, stuttering
knowledge, and phone call were all significant predictors of momentary perception of
spontaneity; while superordinate was not. The null hypothesis was that the coefficient
superordinate is zero (𝛽24 =0), the alternative hypothesis was that the coefficient for
superordinate did not equal zero. We can cannot reject the null hypothesis based on the F-test
results (p=.291) and we removed superordinate from the model.
Table 15.
Reduced Model for Momentary Perception of Fluency
Type 3 Tests of Moment Level Fixed Effects
Effect
Challenge

F value
52.73

P value
<.0001

Superordinate

1.12

0.2910

Stuttering Knowledge

5.36

<.0001

Phone Call

7.98

<.0001
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Final Model
The final model for momentary perception of fluency included age, gender, SESAS, and
SSI as person level fixed effects, with only SSI a significant predictor of momentary perceived
fluency, and the random participant effect. It also included challenge, stuttering knowledge, and
phone call as moment level fixed effects, all of these were significant predictors of spontaneity.
Stuttering knowledge was modeled at categorical variables. Assuming the participant’s speaking
partner did not know they stuttered was used as the reference level for stuttering knowledge.
Having told their speaking partners that they stuttered, suspecting that their speaking partner
heard them stutter and knew they stutter, and suspecting that their speaking partner heard them
stutter and may not have known they stuttered all significantly decreased participant fluency.
The parameter estimate for all these fixed effects are shown in Table 16. For every one
unit change in a fixed effect, and all other fixed effects held equal, momentary perception of
fluency can be expected to change by that effect’s parameter estimate. For example, all other
effects held equal, momentary perception of fluency is expected to decrease by .6546 during a
phone call and to decrease by .7503 when speaking to someone who has heard the speaker stutter
and recognized it as such.
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Table 16.
Momentary Perception of Fluency Final Parameter Estimates
Fixed Effect
Intercept
Age
Gender
SESAS
SSI
Challenge
Stuttering Knowledge

Level of Categorical Variable

Estimate
6.8547
0.006968
0.08171
0.1131
-0.03714
-0.2028

Pr > F

Pr > |t|
<.0001

0.6248
0.7969
0.1944
0.0453
<.0001
<.0001

Discussed
They have asked about stuttering
They have heard me stuttering and know
They have heard me stutter and may not know
I have told them I stutter
They do not know I stutter

-0.1424
0.3987
-0.3997
0.0740
-0.7503
0.0001
-0.5701
0.0047
-0.7047
0.0001
0
.
Phone Call
-0.6546
<.0001
Note: SESAS is the Self-Efficacy Scale for Adults who Stutter (Ornstein & Manning, 1985), SSI is the
Stuttering Severity Instrument 4-th Edition (Riley, 2009)

3.2.3 Model Diagnostics for Momentary Perception of Spontaneity and Fluency
Our model assumes that the residual variance is normally distributed. We can test this
assumption by plotting the calculated residual variances versus randomly generated, independent
standard normal data. This is called a quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot. If the calculated data are
normally distributed, the bulk of the points of Q-Q plot should lie along the center. The Q-Q plot
for the momentary perception of spontaneity residuals is shown in Figure 6 and the Q-Q plot for
the momentary perception of fluency is shown in Figure 7. Both residuals are normally
distributed.
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Figure 6. Normality of Momentary Perception of Spontaneity Residuals
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Figure 7. Normality of Momentary Perception of Spontaneity Residuals

3.3 Life Impact of Stuttering
3.3.1 Hypothesis Testing: OASES
We tested the influence of mean momentary perception of spontaneity, mean momentary
perception of fluency, and listener observed fluency on the life impact of stuttering. Life impact
of stuttering was measured by the OASES and listener observed fluency was measured by the
SSI. The equation for this model is given in Appendix D.
The solutions for these fixed effects are shown in Table 17. Only mean perceived
spontaneity was a significant predictor of life impact of stuttering (p=.0003). All other effects
held constant, for every one unit increase in mean perceived spontaneity we can expect a .4848
76

decrease in OASES score. Both mean perceived fluency and observed fluency failed to reach
significance (p=.2240 and p=.0795 respectively).
Table 17.
Life Impact of Stuttering (OASES) with Parameter Estimates
Fixed Effect
Estimate
Pr > F
Pr > |t|
Intercept
4.3292
<.0001
Mean Perceived Spontaneity
-0.4848
.0003
Mean Perceived Fluency
0.1542
.2240
Observed Fluency (SSI)
0.01831
.0795
Note: OASES is the Overall Assessment of the Speaker's Experience of Stuttering (Yaruss
& Quesal, 2010), SSI is the Stuttering Severity Instrument 4-th Edition (Riley, 2009)

3.3.2 Model Diagnostics for Life Impact of Stuttering
Our model assumes that the residual variance is normally distributed. We can test this
assumption by plotting the calculated residual variances versus randomly generated, independent
standard normal data. This is called a quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot. If the calculated data are
normally distributed the bulk of the points of Q-Q plot should lie along the center. The Q-Q plot
for the OASES residuals is shown in Figure 8. The residuals are normally distributed.
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Figure 8. Normality of OASES Residuals
4. Discussion
We measured spontaneity with in situ surveys administered through a cell phone
application. To assess whether these measurements were useful and meaningful, we take a closer
look at the models for momentary perception of spontaneity and momentary perception of
fluency. We then compare the two measures to determine spontaneity’s distinctness from fluency
and discuss spontaneity’s consequences.
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4.1 Momentary Perception of Spontaneity
A summary of the results for momentary perception of spontaneity is shown in Figure 9.
Individuals with greater self-efficacy, individuals speaking to family members, and individuals
speaking to people with whom they have discussed stuttering all reported feeling more
spontaneous. Individuals speaking in challenging situations, individuals speaking to
superordinates, individuals giving presentations or speaking on the phone, and individuals
speaking on Mondays and Saturdays all reported feeling less spontaneous.

Increases Spontaneity
• Self-Efficacy
• Speaking to family
• Speaking to people with whom you've discussed
stuttering

Decreases Spontaneity
• Mondays and Saturdays
• Challenging situations
• Speaking to superordinates
• Giving presentations
• Talking on the phone

Figure 9. Significant Effects on Momentary Perception of Spontaneity
Self-efficacy, in the context of stuttering, is a person’s confidence in their ability to
manage their stuttering in challenging situations (Bandura, 1977; Carter, Breen, Yaruss, &
Beilby, 2017; Ornstein & Manning, 1985). Self-efficacy has been linked to higher resilience in
people who stutter (Craig, Blumgart, & Tran, 2011), increased ability to manage
psychopathology symptoms (Maciejewski, Prigerson, & Mazure, 2000), and improved
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competence during challenging life experiences (Arnstein, Caudill, Mandle, Norris, & Beasley,
1999). Self-efficacy gives a sense of control over one’s life and environment (Carter et al., 2017;
Craig, Blumgart, & Tran, 2009). This sense of control, in terms of speech, manifests as the
confidence that one can proceed forward in speaking regardless of stuttering (Boyle, 2016). In
that spontaneity, whether fluent or disfluent, represents speech that does not need to be attended
to, speakers who tend towards spontaneity could reasonably be assumed to be more confident in
their ability to handle their stuttering. Conversely, speakers who are more confident in their
ability to enter speaking situations and manage their speech might therefore be more
spontaneous. We cannot tell from this analysis whether spontaneity leads to self-efficacy or
whether self-efficacy leads to spontaneity. However, it is likely that they are mutually
reinforcing constructs.
Having discussed stuttering with a speaking partner significantly increased spontaneity.
This is an encouraging finding because, while the speaker does not have control over who is in
their family, who is their boss, or the day of the week, they do have control over whether they
disclose and talk about stuttering. This finding harmonizes well with past research. Other
marginalized groups, including those with disabilities and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and queer communities have found that disclosing to others leads to selfempowerment and decreases vulnerability to negative misperceptions (Corrigan, Kosyluk, &
Rüsch, 2013). Disclosure is a common strategy in stuttering therapy and has been shown to have
a positive effect on listener perceptions of stuttering (Boyle, Dioguardi, & Pate, 2016, 2017;
Byrd, Gkalitsiou, McGill, Reed, & Kelly, 2016; Franck, Jackson, Pimentel, & Greenwood, 2003;
Hartford & Leahy, 2007). Importantly, self-disclosures must be informative to change listener
perceptions (Byrd, McGill, Gkalitsiou, & Cappellini, 2017). Disclosures that conveyed little
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information or were apologetic did not improve listener perceptions (Collins & Blood, 1990;
Healey, Gabel, Daniels, & Kawai, 2007; Lee & Manning, 2010). This could explain why
discussion of stuttering significantly improved spontaneity but simply mentioning to the listening
partner that they stuttered did not.
Anecdotal reports by people who stutter often mention difficulty speaking on the phone,
while giving presentations, and in challenging situations. Likewise, we would expect speaking to
family members to be easier and speaking to superordinates (likes bosses, teachers, and
managers) to be more difficult. Family members are more likely to know that the participants
stutter and stuttering in front of them is less likely to result in consequences. Participants may
reasonably be hiding stuttering from their superordinates for fear of consequences and penalties
should they hear them stutter (Constantino, Manning, & Nordstrom, 2017). The effort involved
in hiding stuttering would certainly inhibit spontaneity.
It is not clear why Mondays and Saturdays were significantly less spontaneous days.
Other experience sampling method studies have shown that happiness and motivation are lowest
at work (Csikszentmihalyi & Graef, 1980; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010), and Monday is the
harbinger of the work week. However, being at work was a variable in our model and it was not
significant. Saturdays are even more perplexing. Perhaps on Saturdays people are most likely to
do activities that are nonroutine, and therefore, meet and speak with strangers. This seems
logical, but again, speaking to strangers was a fixed effect in our loaded model and it did not
make a significant contribution. We removed the fixed effect for day of the week from the model
to see if enough variance would be redistributed to the fixed effects for speaking to a stranger
and being at work to make them significant. It did not. Monday and Saturday have in common
that they start the work week and weekend, respectively. They sit at the shift from weekend to
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weekday and back again. This represents a change in schedule that may affect sleep patterns and
other lifestyle habits. Anecdotal reports from people who stutter suggest that stuttering may be
exacerbated by poor sleep (Merlo, 2012; Trichon & Tetnowski, 2011).
4.2 Momentary Perception of Fluency
We now turn to the model for momentary perception of fluency summarized in Figure
10. Individuals with more observable disfluencies, individuals speaking in challenging situations,
speaker’s talking on the phone, speaker’s talking to people who heard them stutter, and speaker’s
speaking to people who they have told they stutter all reported a decrease in perceived fluency.

Decreases Perception of Fluency
• More observable disfluency (SSI)
• Challenging situations
• Speaking to people who have heard you
stutter or you have told you stutter
• Talking on the phone

Figure 10. Significant Effects on Momentary Perception of Spontaneity
The strong prediction of perceived fluency with observed fluency helps to establish
criterion validity of the measure. We would expect that people with more observable disfluencies
would perceive themselves as more disfluent. If this was not the case the measure of momentary
perception of fluency would be suspect.
The decrease in perceived fluency in challenging situations may seem intuitive, but this
phenomenon has not yet been reported in the literature. It is plausible that challenging situations
may put individuals under more emotional, cognitive, and physical stress and, thus, decrease
fluency (Blood, Wertz, Blood, Bennett, & Simpson, 1997). However, since the challenge was
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unrelated to speech, it is also plausible that challenging situations could force participants to
concentrate on something outside of themselves, reducing self-consciousness, and, consequently,
increase fluency (Eichorn, Marton, Schwartz, Melara, & Pirutinsky, 2016; Ginsberg, 2000). In
this study challenging situations reduced both spontaneity and fluency; however, it is possible
that diverse types of challenges have different effects on the subjective experience of speaking.
Additional research is needed to explore this further.
Many people who stutter report phone calls being difficult and it was, therefore, not
surprising that fluency decreased on the phone. It is harder to explain the decrease in fluency
when talking to people who have heard them stutter in the past or who they have told they
stutter. This is especially difficult to interpret considering the spontaneity model result in which
discussing stuttering increased spontaneity.
Although spontaneity and fluency are correlated, they can vary independently. One can
have high spontaneity and low fluency and vice versa. It is possible that advertising stuttering
makes it easier to speak because the speaker no longer must control, hide, or obfuscate their
stuttering. When the speaker no longer feels pressure to be fluent, they are more spontaneous but
allow more disfluency in their speech. Speakers may speak more often and in more detail to
people who already know they stutter and, therefore, they stutter more with them. These
speculations must be made cautiously; however, because discussing stuttering did not
significantly decrease fluency. Additional research will be needed to shed light on this issue.
4.3 Spontaneity vs Fluency
There are several explanations for why momentary perception of spontaneity and
momentary perception of fluency were highly correlated. The first is that fluent speech tends to
be more spontaneous than stuttered speech. Moments of effortless fluency would be rated as
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spontaneous, much like the fluency of nonstuttering speakers. The more often a person who
stutters speaks fluently without effort, the more spontaneous they will be.
The second explanation is that speakers conflate the two experiences. People who
covertly stutter often say they stutter quite frequently, the stutters just do not reach the surface
(Constantino et al., 2017). This suggests that what they are calling the stutter is not the physical
disfluency, but the underlying feeling, what Cooper (1968) called “loss of control”. This
underlying feeling would certainly inhibit spontaneity. If they are gauging their fluency based on
this feeling than it would impact their momentary perception of fluency as well. It is possible
people do not often distinguish between feeling spontaneous and feeling fluent.
The third explanation is that the questions used to measure both spontaneity and fluency
did not distinguish them enough. This study has established that spontaneity of speech can be
measured but future research will need to determine the best way to measure it. Momentary
perception of spontaneity was calculated from the mean of eighteen different Likert questions
derived from focus groups conducted with people who stutter (refer to Table 3). It is likely that
all these questions are not needed to assess one’s momentary perception of spontaneity.
Reducing the number of questions would significantly reduce the time needed to fill out the
survey and reduce the burden on the participants. Some of the questions may be less relevant
than others and add noise to the measurement. This noise could have contributed to the similarity
between momentary perception of fluency and momentary perception of spontaneity.
Regardless of the explanation, spontaneity was meaningfully distinct from fluency, as
indicated by their dissimilar models. Spontaneity was predicted by self-efficacy and perceived
fluency was predicted by observed fluency. Perhaps more importantly, spontaneity was a
significant predictor of life impact of stuttering while fluency – whether speaker perceived or
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listener observed – was not. This supports our hypothesis that a measure of the degree to which
speech is spontaneous—whether fluent or stuttered—is a more accurate predictor of speakers’
ratings of their stuttering experience, as indicated by significantly lower scores on the OASES,
than the frequency of their stuttering.
4.4 Clinical Considerations
The result of this study show that an increase in spontaneity reduces the impact of the
stuttering on one’s life regardless of whether there is a corresponding increase in fluency.
Spontaneous fluency is often the goal of speech therapy programs treating stuttering. The
path many treatment approaches take to spontaneous fluency is through effortful fluency, see
Figure 11 (Baxter et al., 2015; Bothe, Davidow, Bramlett, & Ingham, 2006). For these
approaches, the most meaningful therapeutic outcome is helping the client move from disfluent
speech to fluent speech, regardless of spontaneity. This is represented by the arrow crossing the
Y axis, connecting points one and two, in Figure 11. Speech naturalness is also sometimes
targeted, but this is judged from the listeners perspective not the speakers (Ingham, Gow, &
Costello, 1985; Ingham & Onslow, 1985; Martin, Haroldson, & Triden, 1984). Even when
people who stutter rate their own speech (Ingham, Ingham, Onslow, & Finn, 1989), naturalness
is a measure of how speech sounds rather than how speech feels and is, therefore, very different
from spontaneity.
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Figure 11. Spontaneous Fluency through Effortful Fluency
An example of this focus on movement across the Y axis is seen in fluency shaping
approaches, which are widely used in the treatment of stuttering (Cordes & Ingham, 1998;
Costello, 1983; Ingham, 1984; Perkins, 1973; Ryan, 2001; Webster, 1974, 1975). These
techniques can often rapidly reduce stuttering frequency (Bloodstein, 1949, 1950; Sheehan,
1980). However, they rely on focused self-monitoring of physiological targets resulting in
effortful fluency. Using these speaking patterns outside of contrived therapeutic situations is
often difficult and fluency improvements are frequently not maintained, i.e. relapse is common
(Boberg, 1986; Craig & Hancock, 1995; Kamhi, 1982; Prins, 1970).
The practitioners of these therapies believe that eventually these skills will be learned
sufficiently to be automatized, leading to effortless fluency (Webster, 1974, 1975). This is
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represented by the arrow connecting points two and three in Figure 11. However, there is little
evidence for this. Boberg and Kully (1994) used the Speech Performance Questionnaire (Perkins,
1981) to assess the effects of a fluency shaping program one and two years post treatment. Of the
30 participants, none of them said they can, “speak normally without thinking about controlling
their speech,” 50% said they always or sometimes need to think about controlling their speech to
speak normally. More recent studies have indicated the fluent speech of people who stutter is
perceived as more effortful and less automatic than fluent controls (Ingham et al., 2006;
Saltuklaroglu, Teulings, & Robbins, 2009). Compared to those who have taken part in stuttering
modification, avoidance reduction, or combined approaches, people who stutter who have only
taken part in fluency shaping approaches to therapy are significantly more likely to experience
relapse and report that treatment is unsuccessful (Yaruss et al., 2002).
The results of the life impact regression equation suggest that movement over the X axis
(from effortful to spontaneous speech) represents a more meaningful change for people who
stutter, see the arrow connecting points one and two in Figure 12. Some treatment strategies aim
to remove extra behaviors, such as secondaries and avoidances, that people who stutter have
added to their speech in attempts to be fluent or as reactions to their stuttering (Cooper, 1968;
Sheehan & Sheehan, 1984; Sisskin & Baer, 2013; Van Riper, 1973; Williams, 1957). These
behaviors are often a barrier to spontaneity. By gradually deconditioning these learned behaviors
speech becomes easier, requiring less effort and attention. It is possible that over time this leads
to greater spontaneity during both moments of stuttering and moments of fluency.
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Figure 12. Spontaneous Fluency through Spontaneous Disfluency
Research on the successful management of stuttering has found that while speech can
become spontaneous over time, fluency may require constant vigilance for most people (Plexico,
Manning, & DiLollo, 2005). Spontaneous speech is often an achievable long term goal and
contributes significantly to improved quality of life while fluency is more tenuous and, “not a
necessary nor sufficient criterion for success” (Plexico et al., 2005, p. 17). Often individuals who
claim to have successfully managed their stuttering will continue to have some noticeable
disfluencies in their speech. However, both their stuttering and their fluency elicit minimal
reactions and do not require conscious control (Finn et al., 2005; Plexico et al., 2005; Van Riper,
1973; Williams, 1957). This process is represented by the dotted arrows between points two and
three in Figure 12.
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A closer look at the graph of momentary perception of fluency versus momentary
perception of spontaneity in Figure 5 show very few data points were fluency was high and
spontaneity was low. This may indicate that if speech is fluent, spontaneity has a floor. Fluency
itself, even when under effortful control, may grant a certain amount of spontaneity to the
speaker. Participants in this study were not asked to use specific speaking techniques, so it is
difficult to interpret these data further. However, this could have ramifications for clinical work
and deserves further investigation.
4.5. Limitations
This study examined spontaneous speech of people who stutter during everyday speaking
situations. It did not include fluent speakers and it did not attempt to manipulate spontaneity. An
assumption of the underlying theory guiding this research is that normally fluent speech can be
considered spontaneously fluent. The subjective experience of the authors suggests this is a
reasonable assumption, however, it has not been tested empirically. Future research will need to
measure the spontaneity of fluent speakers in everyday life to adequately compare their
experiences to those of people who stutter.
In our discussion of clinical considerations, we make some assumptions of therapy based
on our results and the research literature. We assume that those employing fluency shaping
techniques will improve fluency without improving spontaneity. Fluency gained will require
increased concentration and attention on speaking. However, we have not measured spontaneity
during the application of different therapeutic strategies. While our assumption is based on the
literature (Boberg & Kully, 1994; Ingham et al., 2006; Yaruss et al., 2002), it is also possible that
some people who stutter have disfluencies that are so arduous that the effort required to use
fluency shaping is less than the effort required to stutter. In fact, the scarcity of data points
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indicating moments of high fluency and low spontaneity in Figure 5 suggests that highly fluent
speech is always at least moderately spontaneous. Therefore, fluency achieved by effortful
control may be more spontaneous than effortful stuttering. For some people who stutter,
employing effortful fluency strategies may increase both their fluency and their spontaneity. This
will be a very fruitful topic for future research.
We speculate that stuttering modification and avoidance reduction therapy (Cooper,
1968; Sheehan & Sheehan, 1984; Sisskin & Baer, 2013; Van Riper, 1973; Williams, 1957)
remove barriers to spontaneity and increase the ease of speaking. These assumptions are
supported by the literature (Plexico et al., 2005; Yaruss et al., 2002) but have not been directly
assessed. We do not know how spontaneity changes over time in response to therapy. Future
research on spontaneity must measure its response to various therapy strategies.
Given the high rates of relapse for fluency-oriented therapy approaches (Boberg, 1986;
Craig & Hancock, 1995; Kamhi, 1982; Prins, 1970), it is imperative that we develop therapy
approaches that produce robust, long-lasting results. Spontaneity’s perseverance over time has
not been directly studied; although, past research suggests it might persist (Plexico et al., 2005;
Van Riper, 1973). Studies of successful stuttering management and treatment outcomes that
measure spontaneity can help answer this question.

5. Conclusion
This study measured the spontaneity of stuttered speech during real situations in their
everyday lives. Spontaneity was improved by increased self-efficacy and by discussing one’s
stuttering with speaking partners. Spontaneity was meaningfully distinct from fluency: an
increase in spontaneity alone significantly reduced the impact of stuttering on people’s lives;
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while a change in fluency alone did not significantly change the impact of stutter on people’s
life. The achievement of spontaneity is a consequential and valuable goal for those who stutter.
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Chapter 4: General Conclusion
The two studies in this dissertation investigated two aspects of the subjective experience
of stuttering. The first study looked at the experience of passing as fluent. The second study
looked at the experience of effort while speaking.
In the first study I used the ethical theories of philosopher Michel Foucault to
contextualize data obtained from semi-structured interviews with nine participants who pass as
fluent (Foucault, Rabinow, & Dreyfus, 1983/1997). Historically passing has been understood as
a repression of one’s true, authentic self in response to either psychological distress or social
discrimination (Brune & Wilson, 2013). The results of my analysis suggest that rather than a
repression of an authentic self, passing is more usefully understood as a form of resistance by
people who stutter to a hostile society. Participants learned from experiences of delegitimization
that their stuttering had ethical ramifications. Consequently, they used a variety of self-forming
practices to pass and thereby achieve the privileges that come with perceived able-bodiedness.
Passing as fluent is not an inauthentic form of stuttering but a form of stuttering that is
produced through the use of specific technologies of communication. These technologies of
communication are constituted by the unique ethical relationship of the person who stutters with
herself. Passing can be understood as an active form of resistance rather than a passive form of
repression. By theorizing passing as fluent as an ethical relationship, we open up the possibility
of changing the relationship and performing it differently.
In the second study, I measured participants’ momentary perception of spontaneity and
fluency of speech. The experience sampling method was used with 44 people who stutter. They
were surveyed five times a day for one week through their cell phones. Results indicate that
spontaneity and fluency vary by context and day. Importantly, an increase in spontaneity
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significantly decreases the impact of stuttering on people’s lives. Fluency did not significantly
affect life impact of stuttering. The achievement of spontaneity is a more meaningful and
valuable goal for those who stutter and possibly less likely than fluency to result in relapse
following formal therapy.
Both studies shift our understanding of stuttering by looking through the speaker’s
perspective rather than the listeners. Passing as fluent can no longer be seen as a disordered
response to stuttering but, instead, as a reasonable response to societal discrimination. Fluency
can no longer be taken for granted as the primary goal of speech therapy for stuttering. Ease of
speech and spontaneity are more important than fluency for lessening the negative impact of the
disorder on individuals’ lives. Future studies must continue to investigate the speaker’s
subjective experience of stuttering. Through this knowledge we will learn how to best improve
clinician training, treatment outcomes, and, ultimately, the lives of those who stutter.
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Appendix A: Interview Guide
1) Ethical Substance
a) Lead Question – Tell me about your stuttering
i) When were you first aware that you stuttered?
(1) What are your first memories of stuttering?
(2) How did you know?
(3) What was your reaction?
(a) Why do you think you reacted that way?
(4) What were other people’s reactions?
i) How would you define covert stuttering?
ii) How would you define overt stuttering?
iii) What does being covert mean to you?
(1) Why do you consider yourself a covert stutterer?
(2) What do you think makes you different from people who overtly stutter?
iv) Are you able to pass as a fluent speaker?
v) What happens when you do have overt stutters?
(1) What are they like?
(2) If you did not hide your stuttering how frequently would you stutter?
(a) What severity would you consider your unhidden stuttering?
(b) How long would your stutters be?
(c) How tense would your stutters be?
(3) If you a comfortable doing so, can you show me how they sound?
2) Mode of subjection
a) Lead Question – How does society define a good speaker?
i) What type of speech is valued by society?
ii) How does the ideal person talk?
(1) How does stuttering fit into this?
(2) Is there any room for stuttering in this value system?
(a) What would need to change to make room?
(b) What would it mean to be a good stutterer?
(i) How about to be good at stuttering?
iii) How does society react to you stuttering?
(1) Why do you think this is?
iv) Is society comfortable with your stuttering?
(1) What do you do to put society at ease?
(2) Whose responsibility is it to make society comfortable?
(3) What do you do after you stutter?
(a) How do you explain it?
(b) Do you feel the need to repair the situation or cover up the stutter?
(i) What do you do to repair the situation?
(4) How can you tell that your speaking partner is aware that you are stuttering?
(a) What do you do with that information?
v) What kinds of time pressure do you feel while talking?
(1) Does society have the patience to hear your stuttering?
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b) Lead Question – As a person who stutters what are your responsibilities?
i) As a person who stutters what do nonstutterers (fluent people) demand of you?
ii) Tell me about your responsibility to minimize stuttering
(1) Does this include a responsibility to seek treatment?
(a) Does society see stuttering as something that needs fixing?
(i) Tell me more about that
(2) Have you ever had speech therapy?
(a) Tell me about it.
(i) What responsibilities did the therapist demand of you?
(ii) How did it make you view your stuttering?
(b) Have you ever had any other kind of therapy for your stuttering?
(i) Such as psychotherapy
iii) Tell me about your responsibility to say what needs to be said in a certain about
of time
iv) What responsibilities do you have to your speaking partner after you overtly
stutter?
v) Even though you don’t overtly stutter do you consider yourself a fluent person?
(1) Does society consider you a fluent person?
(a) Would you still be considered fluent if society knew your secret?
3) Self-forming activity
a) Lead Question – How do you pass as a fluent speaker?
i) How would you describe the experience of passing?
(1) Where are you able to pass?
(a) In what situations do you make a great effort to be covert?
(2) When are you able to pass?
(3) With whom are you able to pass?
(a) Who knows that you stutter?
(4) Why do you think you are able to pass?
ii) Tell me how you fell about passing?
(1) Does passing elicit any positive feelings for you?
(a) Tell me more
(b) Have you felt pride?
(i) Tell me more
(2) Does passing elicit any negative feelings for you?
(a) Tell me more
(b) Have you felt shame?
(i) Tell me more
iii) How easy is it to pass for you?
(1) How much effort does it require to remain covert?
(a) How voluntary is this effort?
(b) Is it worth it?
(i) Why or why not?
(2) Tell me how hiding your stuttering fluctuates
(a) What makes it worse or harder?
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(b) What makes it better or easier?
iv) What do you experience when approaching a moment of stuttering?
(1) Are you able to predict what you will stutter on or do you figure it out by feel?
(a) What does this feel like?
(b) How are you able to make this prediction?
(2) How do you respond to moments of stuttering?
(a) Are certain things you do easier than others?
(i) What are they?
(b) Are there certain things you do less likely to be interpreted as stuttering by
your listener?
(i) What are they?
v) How do you know when you can speak fluently?
(1) What do you do when you know you cannot speak fluently?
(a) What situations do you not enter into?
(b) What kinds of situations do not give you trouble?
vi) What role does avoidance play in passing as fluent?
(1) How much do you relay on avoidance in order to pass?
(a) What situations do you avoid?
(b) What people do you avoid?
(c) What words do you avoid?
(d) What activities do you avoid?
(e) Anything else?
vii) How do you know when you are going to stutter?
(1) What do you do when you know you are going to stutter?
(a) What role does changing words play?
(i) How do you know you’ll be able to say the word you change to?
(ii) How are you able to change to a word fast enough?
(iii)Do you change the word before or during the stutter?
(b) Do you restart sentences?
(i) How do you know that when you restart it, it will come out fluently?
(2) How do you use interjections?
(a) For example
(i) Like
(ii) Uh
(iii) um
viii) What are the hardest things for you to say?
(1) How do you avoid things that can’t be said any other way?
(a) Your name?
(i) Children’s names?
(ii) Family member’s names?
(b) Profession?
(i) Other job-related jargon
(c) Alma Mata?
(d) Address?
(e) Phone number?
(f) Hometown?
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(g) Ordering off a menu?
ix) Do you have a repertoire of things that you say in different situations?
(1) What do you say when you answer the phone?
(2) What is your go-to greeting?
(a) Saying hi?
(b) Saying bye?
(3) What other go-to sayings do you have?
(a) What happens when these go-to sayings become stuttered?
x) Can you think of examples of things you have done to keep your stuttering
hidden?
(1) What was the most extreme thing you’ve done?
(2) Do you have any funny stories?
(a) Come on you’ve gotta have something….
xi) What techniques work best for hiding your stuttering?
(1) Why do you think they work so well?
(2) How did you develop these?
(3) Where did you learn them?
xii) What techniques do not work well for hiding your stuttering?
(1) Why do they not work well?
4) Telos
a) Lead Question – When you pass what are you trying to communicate? What are
your goals? Why do you pass?
i) Tell me about what motivates you to be covert?
(1) What is wrong with society that motivates you to be covert?
(2) What is it about your local environment that makes it difficult for you to stutter
openly?
(a) How does society view people who stutter?
(i) Why do you think this is?
(ii) How does society view fluent people?
(3) What would need to change in society to allow you to openly stutter?
(4) In an ideal society how would you speak?
(5) What does society keep you from doing that you would like to do?
(a) Where do you not go?
(i) What would need to change at XXX to allow you to go there?
(b) Who do you not talk to?
(i) What would need to change about XXX to allow you to talk to them?
(c) How do you not act?
(6) What else motivates you to be covert?
(a) Have these motivations changed over time?
(b) Do you think you will always be covert?
ii) Would you currently rather stutter overtly or covertly?
(1) Why?
(2) What would life be like for you as an overt stutterer?
iii) Would you rather stutter overtly or covertly in the future?
(1) Why?
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5) Credibility Questions
a) Thank you for your time, I have finished asking you all the questions that I have. I find
myself wondering if there is anything that I have not asked that you think is important to
understanding covert stuttering in general?
i) How about with understanding your particular experience with covert stuttering?
b) What else do you want me to know?
c) How do you feel about your responses?
d) If there is something you think of later that you would like to share I would appreciate it
if you contacted me. There are many ways we can communicate. Here is a paper with my
contact information. If you have an experience that you would like to share with me,
please email me, send me a text, or call me.
e) Did this interview give you any new ideas regarding stuttering?
i) Did this interview give you any new ideas regarding covert stuttering?
f) Do you have anything else you would like to share?
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Appendix B: Experience Sampling Method Survey
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Since the last beep have you had any conversations
a. Yes  Continues with questionnaire
b. No  Ends questionnaire
During the Conversation, where were you?
a. Home
b. Work
c. School
d. In transit/Commuting
e. Other  manually type in location
Indicate the CHALLENGE of the main activity you were doing
a. Low:1 … 9: High
Indicate your SKILLS at the main activity you were doing
a. Low:1 … 9: High
With whom did you speak (you may choose more than one)?
a. Stranger
b. Acquaintance
c. Friend
d. Family
e. Coworker
f. Romantic Partner
What was the gender of your speaking partner(s) (you may choose more than one)?
a. Same as my own
b. Different from my own
c. Unknown
What was the status of your audience (you may choose more than one)?
a. Subordinate
b. Peer
c. Superordinate
How much did your speaking partner know about your stuttering?
a. They do not know I stutter
b. They have heard me stutter but may not have known it was stuttering
c. They have heard me stutter and probably recognized it as stuttering
d. I have acknowledged my stuttering to them
e. They have asked me questions about my stuttering
f. We often discuss stuttering
Did your speaking partner stutter as well?
a. Yes
b. No
117

10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

c. Unsure
What was the situation in which you spoke (you may choose more than one)?
a. One-on-one
b. Presentation
c. Phone call
d. Group
e. Other
I paid close attention to how I physically spoke
a. 1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
I was embarrassed by my speech
a. 1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
During the conversation, I was primarily listening to
a. 1: My speaking partner … 9: How I spoke
How often did you restart a word, phrase, or sentence?
a. 1: Never … 9: Very often
I enjoyed the conversation
a. 1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
I felt confident
a. 1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
I was able to clearly convey my thoughts and feelings
a. 1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
I am glad I had the conversation
a. 1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
Talking was
a. 1: Easy … 9: Effortful
The amount of physical tension I felt while speaking was
a. 1: Low … 9: High
I felt in charge of my speech
a. 1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
Speaking was like writing in my best handwriting, it required careful concentration
a. 1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
I struggled to get my words out
a. 1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
How fluent was your speech?
a. 1: Low … 9: High
How difficult was it to achieve this fluency?
a. 1: Easy … 9: Difficult
Speaking was like breathing, I never thought of it
a. 1: Easy … 9: Difficult
How much did the possibility of disfluency affect what you said?
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28.
29.
30.
31.

a. 1: A lot … 9: Not at all
I had difficulty finding the right words to express myself
a. 1: Never … 9: Often
I felt unable to control my speech
a. 1: Never … 9: Very often
My speech contained hesitations, pauses, and interjections
a. 1: Never … 9: Very often
I needed to carefully plan out how to say what I wanted to say
a. 1: Completely Agree … 9: Completely Disagree
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Appendix C: Loaded Models for Momentary Perception of Spontaneity and Fluency
𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑚𝑝 𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑚𝑝
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑂𝑓𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘: 𝑆𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑂𝑓𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘: 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽3 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑂𝑓𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘: 𝑇𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽4 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑂𝑓𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘: 𝑊𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽5 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑂𝑓𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘: 𝑇ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽6 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑂𝑓𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘: 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽7 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽8 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒: 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒: 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽10 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒: 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽11 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒: 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽12 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽13 𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽14 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽15 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽16 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽17 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽18 𝐶𝑜𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽19 𝑅𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽20 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽21 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽22 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽23 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽24 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽25 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒: 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑦𝐷𝑜𝑁𝑜𝑡𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽26 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒: 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑦𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑒𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐴𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑁𝑜𝑡𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽27 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒: 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑦𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑒𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐴𝑛𝑑𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽28 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒: 𝑖𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽29 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒: 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑦𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽30 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑜𝑜: 𝑌𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽31 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑜𝑜: 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽32 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑂𝑛𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝
+ 𝛽33 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽34 𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽35 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽36 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑝
+ 𝛽37 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝 + 𝛽38 𝑆𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑝 + 𝛽39 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑝 + 𝜇0𝑝 + 𝜀𝑚𝑝
Equation 1. Loaded Models for Momentary Perception of Spontaneity and Momentary
Perception of Fluency
Where
•
•

The iterators represent moment m experienced by participant p
β0- β39 are the fixed effects
o β0 corresponds to the predicted spontaneity or fluency score when all covariates
are equal to 0.
o β1 – β6 corresponds to the fixed effect of speaking on different days of the week
(these are dummy variables, to evaluate the fixed effect of Saturday set all others
to 0)
o β7 represents the fixed effect for time of day
o β8 – β11 represent the fixed effect for location of conversation
o β12 corresponds to the fixed effect of the challenge of the main activity the
participant was doing
o β12 corresponds to the fixed effect of the participant’s skill in the of the main
activity they were doing
o β13 – β19 corresponds to the fixed effects of speaking to people in different
relationships with the participant
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o β20 & β21 represent the fixed effects for the gender of the participant’s speaking
partners
o β22 – β24 corresponds to the fixed effect of the status of the people the participant
was speaking to
o β25 – β29 represent the fixed effect for how much the participant’s speaking
partner knew about their stuttering (these are dummy variables, to evaluate
whether they have discussed stuttering set all others to 0)
o β30 & β31 represent the fixed effects for the whether the participant’s speaking
partner stutter as well
o β32 – β35 corresponds to the fixed effects for the type of speaking situation the
participant spoke in
o β36 corresponds to the fixed effect of the age of the participant
o β37 corresponds to the fixed effect of the gender of the participant
o β38 corresponds to the fixed effect of the participant’s self-efficacy
o β39 corresponds to the fixed effect of the age of the participant’s observed fluency
•

µ0p represents the random effect associated with the intercept for each participant
2
o µ0p =~N(0, 𝜎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡
), normally distributed with a mean of 0

•

ɛmp represents the residual variance associated with the observation at moment m on
participant p
o ɛmp ~ N(0,σ2), normally distributed with a mean of 0
o independent and identically distributed, conditional on the random effects, and
independent of random effects
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Appendix D: Model Building Hypotheses Tables
Table 18.
Hypothesis Specification and Hypothesis Testing for Momentary Perception of Spontaneity
#
1
2

3

Action
Remove random
participant effect
Remove person
level fixed
effects
Remove moment
level fixed
effects

Hypothesis Specification
Null

Alternative

2
𝜎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡
=0

2
𝜎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡
>0

𝛽36 = 𝛽37 = 𝛽38 =

𝛽36 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽37 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟𝛽38 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟𝛽39 ≠

𝛽39 = 0

0

𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 =

𝛽1 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽2 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽3 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽4 ≠

𝛽5 = 𝛽6 = 𝛽7 = 𝛽8 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽5 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽6 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽7 ≠

𝛽9 = 𝛽10 = 𝛽11 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽8 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽9 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽10 ≠

𝛽12 = 𝛽13 = 𝛽14 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽11 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽12 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽13 ≠

𝛽15 = 𝛽16 = 𝛽17 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽14 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽15 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽16 ≠

𝛽18 = 𝛽19 = 𝛽20 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽17 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽18 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽19 ≠

𝛽21 = 𝛽22 = 𝛽23 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽20 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽21 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽22 ≠

𝛽24 = 𝛽25 = 𝛽26 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽23 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽24 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽25 ≠

𝛽27 = 𝛽28 = 𝛽29 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽26 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽27 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽28 ≠

𝛽30 = 𝛽31 = 𝛽32 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽29 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽30 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽31 ≠

𝛽33 = 𝛽34 = 𝛽35 =0

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽32 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽33 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽34 ≠

Test
Likelihood
Ratio Test
Likelihood
Ratio Test

Hypothesis Test
P value
result
.0000000001
Reject
null
.0000000001
Reject
null

Likelihood
Ratio Test

.0000000001

Reject
null

Likelihood
Ratio Test

.0000000001

Reject
null

Consequence
Keep random
subject effect
Keep person
level fixed
effects
Keep moment
level fixed
effects

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽35 ≠ 0
4

Remove
nonsignificant
person level
fixed effects

𝛽36 = 𝛽37 = 𝛽39 = 0

𝛽36 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽37 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽39 ≠ 0
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Keep
nonsignificant
person level
fixed effects

Table 18. (Continued)
Hypothesis Specification and Hypothesis Testing for Momentary Perception of Spontaneity
#
5

Action
Remove
nonsignificant
moment level
fixed effects

Remove
nonsignificant
person level
fixed effects

Hypothesis Specification
Null
Alternative
𝛽7 = 𝛽8 = 𝛽9 = 𝛽10 = 𝛽7 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽8 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽9 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽10 ≠
𝛽11 = 𝛽13 = 𝛽14 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽11 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽13 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽14 ≠

𝛽15 = 𝛽16 = 6𝛽18 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽15 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽16 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽18 ≠

𝛽19 = 𝛽20 = 𝛽21 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽19 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽20 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽21 ≠

𝛽22 = 𝛽23 = 𝛽30 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽22 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽23 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽30 ≠

𝛽31 = 𝛽32 = 𝛽35 =0

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽31 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽32 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽35 ≠ 0

𝛽36 = 𝛽37 = 𝛽39 = 0

𝛽36 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽37 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽39 ≠ 0
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Test
Likelihood
Ratio Test

Likelihood
Ratio Test

Hypothesis Test
P value
result
0.19
Cannot
reject
null

.0000000001

Reject
null

Consequence
Remove
nonsignificant
moment level
fixed effects

Keep
nonsignificant
person level
fixed effects

Table 19.
Hypothesis Specification and Hypothesis Testing for Momentary Perception of Fluency
#
1
2

3

4

Action
Remove random
participant effect
Remove person level
fixed effects
Remove moment
level fixed effects

Remove
nonsignificant person
level fixed effects

Hypothesis Specification
Null

Alternative

2
𝜎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡
=0

2
𝜎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡
>0

𝛽36 = 𝛽37 = 𝛽38 =

𝛽36 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽37 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟𝛽38 ≠

𝛽39 = 0

0, 𝑜𝑟𝛽39 ≠ 0

𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 =

𝛽1 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽2 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽3 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽4 ≠

𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 𝛽6 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽5 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽6 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽7 ≠

𝛽7 = 𝛽8 = 𝛽9 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽8 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽9 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽10 ≠

𝛽10 = 𝛽11 = 𝛽12 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽11 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽12 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽13 ≠

𝛽13 = 𝛽14 = 𝛽15 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽14 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽15 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽16 ≠

𝛽16 = 𝛽17 = 𝛽18 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽17 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽18 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽19 ≠

𝛽19 = 𝛽20 = 𝛽21 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽20 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽21 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽22 ≠

𝛽22 = 𝛽23 = 𝛽24 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽23 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽24 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽25 ≠

𝛽25 = 𝛽26 = 𝛽27 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽26 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽27 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽28 ≠

𝛽28 = 𝛽29 = 𝛽30 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽29 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽30 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽31 ≠

𝛽31 = 𝛽32 = 𝛽33 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽32 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽33 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽34 ≠

𝛽34 = 𝛽35 =0

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽35 ≠ 0

𝛽36 = 𝛽37 = 𝛽38 = 0

𝛽36 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽37 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽38 ≠ 0
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Test
Likelihood
Ratio Test
Likelihood
Ratio Test

Hypothesis Test
P value
result
.0000000001
Reject
null
.0000000001
Reject
null

Likelihood
Ratio Test

.0000000001

Reject
null

Likelihood
Ratio Test

.0000000001

Reject
null

Consequence
Keep random
subject effect
Keep person
level fixed
effects
Keep moment
level fixed
effects

Keep
nonsignificant
person level
fixed effects

Table 19. (Continued)
Hypothesis Specification and Hypothesis Testing for Momentary Perception of Fluency
#
5

Action
Remove
nonsignificant
moment level fixed
effects

Hypothesis Specification
Null
Alternative
𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 =
𝛽1 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟𝛽2 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟𝛽3 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟𝛽4 ≠
𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 𝛽6 =

0, 𝑜𝑟𝛽5 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟𝛽6 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟𝛽 ≠

𝛽7 = 𝛽8 = 𝛽9 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽8 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽9 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽10 ≠

𝛽10 = 𝛽11 = 𝛽13 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽11 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽13 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽14 ≠

𝛽14 = 𝛽15 = 𝛽16 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽15 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽16 ≠ 0, 𝛽17 ≠

𝛽17 = 𝛽18 = 𝛽19 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽18 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽19 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽20 ≠

𝛽20 = 𝛽21 = 𝛽22 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽21 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽22 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽23 ≠

𝛽23 = 𝛽30 = 𝛽31 =

0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽30 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽31 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽32 ≠

𝛽32 = 𝛽33 = 𝛽35 =0

0, 𝑜𝑟𝛽33 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽35 ≠ 0

Test
Likelihood
Ratio Test

7

Hypothesis Test
P value
result
0.09
Cannot
reject
null

6

Remove
nonsignificant person
level fixed effects

𝛽36 = 𝛽37 = 𝛽38 = 0

𝛽36 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽37 ≠ 0, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽38 ≠ 0

Likelihood
Ratio Test

.0000000001

Reject
null

7

Remove
nonsignificant
moment level fixed
effects

𝛽24 =0

𝛽24 ≠ 0

Type 3 FTest

.291

Cannot
reject
null
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Consequence
Remove
nonsignificant
moment level
fixed effects

Keep
nonsignificant
person level
fixed effects
Remove
nonsignificant
moment level
fixed effect

Appendix E: OASES Model

OASESp = β0 + β1MeanSpontaneityp + β2MeanFluencyp + β3SSIp +ɛp
Equation 2. Life Impact of Stuttering
Where
•
•

•

The iterator represents participant p
β0- β3 are the fixed effects
o β0 corresponds to the predicted OASES score when all covariates are equal to 0.
o β1 corresponds to the fixed effect of mean momentary perception of spontaneity
o β2 represents the fixed effect of mean momentary perception of fluency
o β3 corresponds to the fixed effect of listener observed fluency as measured by the
SSI
ɛp represents the residual variance associated with participant p
o ɛp ~ N(0,σ2), normally distributed with a mean of 0
o independent and identically distributed, conditional on the random effects, and
independent of random effects
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